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Contracting About the Future: Copyright and 
New Media 
By Kate Darling* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Imagine that a production company purchased the rights to a screenplay from a 
writer in 1965.  The film was released and yielded the expected average return at the box 
office.  Twenty years later, the film is re-released for home viewing on videocassette.  It 
becomes a massive financial success, the likes of which were completely unimaginable 
for films prior to the invention of home viewing media.
1
  The creator, who initially 
received a small buy-out fee for the production rights to the work, is not consulted on the 
re-release and has no participation in the proceeds. 
¶2  Now imagine that in 2003, a newspaper publisher wants to release a compilation of 
previously published articles on CD-ROM.  The publisher is also involved in negotiations 
with an online service provider who would like to make previous newspaper editions 
available to subscribers in an online database.  These undertakings will involve articles 
written by thousands of journalists, some of whom are deceased or no longer traceable.  
Finding the original authors (or subsequent right holders) and getting them all to agree to 
re-release their works would be prohibitively difficult. 
¶3  Today is a world of technological change.  The increasingly rapid development of 
new media continuously leads to new and unanticipated ways of distributing copyrighted 
works.  Distribution methods are frequently modernized—sometimes replacing former 
methods, sometimes supplementing them—giving old content new value and creating 
additional sources of wealth.  The performing arts and film industries have witnessed a 
progression over the last few decades from theater to motion pictures, television, 
videocassettes, DVDs, on-demand movies, streaming video, cell phone formats, and 
more.  The music industry has experienced a similar succession of technological 
developments, including piano rolls, vinyl records, 8-tracks, reel-to-reel tapes, cassette 
tapes, CDs, mini discs, MP3 downloads, and streaming audio.  Around the turn of the 
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1
 This is not an uncommon occurrence in the film industry.  One example of a film that was an initial 
financial failure at the box office and later grossed millions of dollars in home viewing format is Walt 
Disney’s Fantasia. See Fantasia (1940)—Trivia, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0032455/trivia (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
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century, new distribution methods such as CDs, online databases, and e-books began to 
revolutionize the print media industry.
2
  Now more than ever, the digital age is changing 
the ways that information can be accessed and distributed by expanding content beyond 
its initial medium.
3
  These developments potentially affect any kind of creative 
authorship.  We are yet unable to imagine what further possibilities the next decade, let 
alone the next century, will bring. 
¶4  Copyright law grants authors4 certain exclusive rights over their creations.  To 
monetize these rights and distribute the work, authors regularly enter into contracts with 
publishers
5
 and assign to the publisher the exclusive rights granted by copyright law, such 
as the rights to produce, publish, and distribute the work.  Copyright terms can last for 
longer than a century.
6
  During this time, the value of the work and the circumstances 
surrounding its distribution may be subject to considerable change.  Consistent with 
notions of freedom of contract, United States copyright law allows authors to grant 
publishers the rights to all known or unknown uses of a work.
7
  Despite the ostensible 
clarity of this norm, courts have struggled considerably with cases where the scope of 
rights transferred is uncertain.
8
  New media developments have generally prompted 
litigation and the issue of which exclusive rights can and should be implicitly licensed 
has never been resolved with consistency.
9
  Furthermore, perceived bargaining 
asymmetries and the unpredictability of a creative work’s success over time has led to 
much discussion surrounding the 1976 Copyright Act’s termination right for authors, 
which will begin to take effect within the next few years.
10
  Many lawmakers, courts, and 
scholars are concerned about the case of the writer whose screenplay rights are bought 
out upfront by the production company.  The concern lies in protecting disadvantaged 
creators from losing out on the later financial success of their work. 
¶5  Looking across borders, it is apparent that other countries have been dealing with 
similar issues within their copyright systems.  Many countries, however, have chosen a 
different approach to the problem.  To prevent authors from signing away rights of 
 
2
 In July 2010, Amazon reported that the number of sold e-books was now consistently higher than that 
of printed books. See Dylan Tweney, Amazon Sells More E-Books than Hardcovers, WIRED (July 19, 2010, 
5:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/07/amazon-more-e-books-than-hardcovers. 
3
 See Marc Breslow et al., An Analysis of Computer and Photocopying Issues from the Point of View of 
the General Public and the Ultimate Consumer, in NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 128 (1979). 
4
 For the purposes of this Article, “author” pertains to any original copyright owner. 
5
 For the purposes of this Article, “publisher” pertains to any entity that acquires rights from the author 
for the purpose of disseminating and benefitting from the copyrighted work. 
6
 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, July 24, 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 30 (as amended on Sept. 28, 1979) (stipulating that, for most works, the length of the copyright 
term must be at least fifty years after the author’s death).  Many countries set even longer terms:  the United 
States stipulates a seventy-year period post mortem. 
7
 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[B] (rev. ed. 2009); Neil 
R. Nagano, Comment, Past Copyright Licenses and the New Video Software Medium, 29 UCLA L. REV. 
1160, 1166 (1982). 
8
 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 10.10[B], 85. 
9
 Id. at 85–94; see also infra note 44. 
10
 See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Judicial Resistance to Copyright Law’s Inalienable Right to 
Terminate Transfers, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 227 (2010); Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright 
Deal in the Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329 (2010); see also infra 
Part II.A. 
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unforeseen future value, some countries simply prohibit granting rights to uses unknown 
at the time of the contract.  The legislative goal of this restrictive measure is primarily 
distributional:  because authors are viewed as entitled to the financial returns of their 
creations, the law intervenes to ensure that they are not “cheated” out of this wealth by 
incautiousness, inexperience, or a lack of bargaining power in dealing with publishers.
11
  
Because this rationale is echoed in current discussions of author termination rights in the 
United States, it seems useful to take a closer look at this alternative approach and its 
effectiveness in dealing with the general underlying issue in other countries. 
¶6  This Article delves into the reasoning behind European restrictions on granting 
rights to unknown uses of copyrighted works and evaluates the legislative assumptions 
from a law and economics perspective.  This Article finds it economically plausible that 
the distribution deemed undesirable by the restrictive legislatures will occur in absence of 
legal intervention.  When individuals, such as the screenplay writer, engage in contract 
negotiations with publishers, they are often in a poor bargaining position due to economic 
factors that leave authors with the shorter end of deals. 
¶7  This Article also argues, however, that the chosen solution of preventing authors 
from transferring rights to uses that do not yet exist may have effects that counteract the 
legislative goals.  Restricting the grant of rights to unknown uses essentially means that a 
new contract negotiation is necessary between author and publisher whenever a new 
distribution method emerges.  As illustrated in the case of the newspaper publisher’s 
difficulty releasing article compilations in digital form, this practice can give rise to 
transaction costs and other hindrances to market exchange.  Importantly, not only does 
this situation harm the publisher, it also may harm authors by decreasing the total number 
of rights transfers or leaving them with unfavorable terms.  In light of this result, 
restrictions on granting the rights to new uses should be considered with caution, even by 
author-protective legislatures, as they might not be suitable instruments for distributing 
wealth to creators. 
¶8  The analysis of this Article is descriptive.  It focuses on what the European 
legislatures are trying to achieve with restrictions on transfers of new use rights and 
evaluates whether they are likely to reach their goal.  While using elements of economic 
welfare theory, this Article distinguishes between general wealth lost due to economic 
market failure and the loss of distributable wealth to authors due to bargaining 
disadvantages.  Whether or not the latter is a warranted ground for intervention from an 
economic welfare perspective, it is largely what the legislatures in question aim to 
correct.  For this and other reasons,
12
 this Article refrains from a general welfare analysis 
and instead examines and evaluates the concrete legislative assumptions and goals.  
Although this Article’s conclusions do not determine the optimal design of new use right 
laws, they provide helpful insights and indicate a sensible direction for further research 
and legislative discussion.  Market reality and technological change call for continuous 
reconsideration of copyright laws.  For example, in 2008, Germany fundamentally 
reformed its previously prohibitive approach to the grant of unknown use rights, and 
 
11
 Although the argument could also be made that the distribution of wealth to authors serves to 
incentivize investment in artistic creation, such economic reasoning is scarce in the legislative discussion 
on restricting new use right grants.  Instead, the distribution rationale is regularly based on natural rights 
theories or fairness concerns. See infra Part III. 
12
 See infra Part V.  
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other countries, such as India, are currently engaged in legislative debate over introducing 
such a restriction.
13
  This Article helps to draw a better picture of the costs and benefits 
involved in the various methods of achieving legislatures’ goals. 
¶9  Part II establishes the legal approaches to new use right grants in the United States 
and in the prominent European jurisdictions of Germany and France.  Part III looks at the 
legislative reasoning for restricting new use right grants in France and pre-reform 
Germany.  Part IV evaluates this reasoning in light of applicable economic theory.  Part 
V concludes and discusses possible future implications. 
II. LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF NEW USE RIGHTS 
¶10  The United States generally allows the free transfer of rights to unknown uses of 
copyrighted works.
14





  Some countries, however, limit copyright grants to those 
distribution methods known at the time of the contract.  This restrictive approach is taken 













 and the Czech Republic.
23
  France has a system that 
 
13
 The latest copyright reform bill in India, currently in parliamentary discussion, introduces a new 
provision that would prohibit the grant of rights to unknown uses. See Copyright (Amendment) Bill, Rajya 
Sabha 24, § 6 (2010) (India) (as introduced), available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Copyright%20Act/The%20Copyright%20Bill%202010.pdf. See 
also STANDING COMM. ON HUMAN RES. DEV., REP. NO. 227, REPORT ON THE COPYRIGHT (AMENDMENT) 
BILL, 2010 (2010) (India), available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Copyright%20Act/SCR%20Copyright%20Bill%202010.pdf 
(committee report leading to the amendment). 
14
 See infra Part II.A.  
15
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c.48, §§ 90, 91 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/data.pdf; see also MICHAEL CHOI, STELLUNG DES URHEBERS 
UND SEIN SCHUTZ IM URHEBERVERTRAGSRECHT SOWIE IM COPYRIGHT CONTRACT LAW: EINE 
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE STUDIE [POSITION OF THE AUTHOR AND HIS PROTECTIONS IN THE COPYRIGHT 
CONTRACT ACT VERSUS COPYRIGHT CONTRACT LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY] 171 (2007). 
16
 Copyright and Related Rights Act 2008 §§ 120, 121 (Act No. 28/2000) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2000/en.act.2000.0028.pdf. 
17
 See infra Part II.B. 
18
 Intellectual Property Law art. 43(5) (B.O.E. 1996, 97) (Spain), translated in Spain: Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/1996 of April 12 Approving the Revised Law on Intellectual Property, Regularizing, Clarifying 
and Harmonizing the Applicable Statutory Provisions, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=1358 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
19
 Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins [Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights] of 
June 30, 1994, art. 3(1), MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], July 27, 1994, 19297 
(Belg.), translated in Belgium: Law on Copyrights and Neighboring Rights, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG, 
http://wipo.int/clea/en/details.jsp?id=348 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012); see also Frank Gotzen, Das belgische 
Urhebervertragsrecht [Belgian Copyright Contract Law], in URHEBERRECHT IM INFORMATIONSZEITALTER: 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WILHELM NORDEMANN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 8. JANUAR 2004 [COPYRIGHT LAW IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE: COMMEMORATING WILHELM NORDEMANN’S 70TH BIRTHDAY ON JANUARY 8, 
2004] 515, 520 (Ulrich Loewenheim ed., 2004) (Ger.) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE]. 
20
 Nomos (1993:2121) Pneymatikh idiokthsia, syggenika dikaiwmata kai politistika themata [Law on 
Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters], EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES 
DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 1993, A:25, art. 13(5) (Greece), translated in Greece: Law 2121/1993 on 
Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/details.jsp?id=1790 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
21
 Ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych [Act on Copyright and Neighboring Rights] of 
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allows the grant of unknown use rights but is considerably restrictive in effect.
24
  There is 
currently a legislative proposal in India that aims to introduce a prohibition on such 
grants.
25
  This Part describes the legal landscapes of prominent jurisdictions—
specifically, the United States, pre-reform Germany, and France.  It finds that the two 
European copyright regimes are more restrictive in their legal treatment of new use rights 
than is U.S. copyright law. 
A. New Use Rights in the United States 
¶11  United States copyright law, often portrayed as the counterpart to author-protective 
systems, such as in France, does not restrict the voluntary transfer of new use rights.
26
  
The United States generally allows a transfer of copyright in its entirety.
27
  In the case of 
a full transfer, there is no question that all exclusive rights pass on to the transferee, 
regardless of whether these rights pertain to known or unknown uses of the work.
28
  
Thus, if an author transfers her entire copyright to another party, that party will obtain the 
rights to use the work in all media developed after the transfer. 
¶12  The question of unknown uses only arises when specific exclusive rights are 
transferred or licensed.  In this situation, United States copyright law imposes no 
restrictions on the author regarding the alienation of rights to future uses.  These rights 
can be transferred if it is the explicitly expressed will of the contracting parties.
29
  The 
accumulation of case law on new use right grants in the United States therefore mainly 
deals with situations where there is no explicitly expressed will of the parties.  Here, legal 
scholars and courts apply the principles of general contract law.  The rights to new uses 
are thereby generally allocated according to the implicit will of the parties.
30
  Therefore, 
even when the contract does not explicitly provide for it, a transferee may be able to 
appropriate such rights from the author.  Many such decisions follow the lead of Bartsch 
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., in which the Second Circuit held that the granted motion 
 
Feb. 4, 1994, DZIENNIK USTAWA [DZ. U.] 1994 Nr 24, poz. 83, art. 41(4) (Pol.), translated in Poland: Law 
of February 4, 1994, on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3500 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
22
 1999. évi LXXVI. törvény a szerzői jogról (Act LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright Law), art. 44(2) 
(Hung.), translated in Hungary: Act No. LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/details.jsp?id=2213 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
23
 Zákon č. 121/2000 Sb., autorský zákon, art. 46(2) [Copyright Act] (Czech), translated in Czech 
Republic: Law No. 121/2000 Coll. of 7 April 2000 on Copyright, Rights Related to Copyright and on the 
Amendment of Certain Laws (Copyright Act), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/details.jsp?id=962 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
24
 See infra Part II.C. 
25
 See supra note 13. 
26
 See Nagano, supra note 7, at 1166; JENS WEICHE, US-AMERIKANISCHES URHEBERVERTRAGSRECHT 
[AMERICAN COPYRIGHT CONTRACT LAW] 108 (2002) (Ger.). 
27
 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2006) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part 
. . . .”); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, at 85; PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 
§§ 5.1, 5.1.1.1 (3d ed. 2005; electronic version, updated 2010). 
28
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106; Nagano, supra note 7, at 1166. 
29
 See Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 538 F. Supp. 211, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Neil Netanel, 
Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental 
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 70 (1994); Nagano, supra note 7, at 1166. 
30
 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 10.10[B]; Joanne Benoit Nakos, Comment, An Analysis of 
the Effect of New Technology on the Rights Conveyed by Copyright License Agreements, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 
433, 438 (1995). 
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picture rights to a musical included the television rights.
31
  The agreement referred to 
“motion picture rights throughout the world” and allowed MGM to “otherwise reproduce 
the . . . play . . . visually or audibly by the art of cinematography or any process 
analogous thereto.”
32
  The court read the agreement as implying intent on the author’s 




¶13  Problems arise, however, when the parties have no discernible will at all—for 
instance, when they use overly vague contract clauses or when both parties simply do not 
anticipate the possibility of a new distribution method at the time of the contract.  Such 
cases have been the subject of much litigation and legal analysis in the United States.
34
  
Generally, these cases settle or become subject to ambiguous rulings by the court 
system.
35
  Various approaches exist to allocate the rights in these situations.  For instance, 
applying the principle of interpreting unclear clauses in favor of the non-drafting party 
would have authors retain any rights not expressed by their intent.
36
  The leading case 
applying a restrictive approach to interpret grants is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cohen 
v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
37
  The court held that a license to a musical composition 
that includes a right to exhibit a film on television does not include the right to expand to 
videocassettes, explaining:  “Although the language of the license permits the recording 
and copying of the movie with the musical composition in it, in any manner, medium, or 
form, nothing in the express language of the license authorizes distribution of the copies 
to the public by sale or rental.”
38
  The court thus read the lack of a clause granting 
videocassette rights to Paramount to mean that they were retained, even adding that “[t]he 




¶14  Another view advocates that licensees should have all the rights that are reasonably 
within the scope of the distribution method and purpose.
40
  In Boosey & Hawkes Music 
Publishers v. Walt Disney Co.,
41
 the Second Circuit held that the right to record the 
musical composition “in any manner, medium or form for use in [a] motion picture” 
included videocassette rights.
42
  The court stated that the licensee should be able to 
 
31
 Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968). 
32
 Id. at 152. 
33
 Id. at 154. 
34
 For an overview of the case law, see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 10.10[B]; see also Nakos, 
supra note 30, at 436; Nagano, supra note 7, at 1169; Carolina Saez, Enforcing Copyrights in the Age of 
Multimedia, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 351, 374–77 (1995); Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, 
Don’t Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright’s New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing 
Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 908–20 (1995); Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt 
Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 1998). 
35
 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, at § 10.10[B]. 
36
 At least when they are dealing with standard form contracts and other publisher-drafted agreements, 
such is the norm in many publishing industries. See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993). 
37
 Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988). 
38
 Id. at 853. 
39
 Id. at 854 (quoting Nagano, supra note 7, at 1184). 
40
 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, at 86–87; see also Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, 
Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1983); Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 538 F. Supp. 211, 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
41
 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998). 
42
 Id. at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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¶15  None of the approaches appears to have decisively gained the upper hand.44  
Nevertheless, the relevant observation for the purpose of this Part is that the voluntary 
transfer of new use rights is neither forbidden nor prohibitively restricted in the United 
States.  This is not to say that United States copyright law ignores the problem of 
unforeseen future value of creative works—author termination rights provide a 
mechanism for dealing with these issues.  The 1976 Copyright Act contains a provision 
that grants the author (and successors) a general contract termination right after a period 
of thirty-five years.
45
  Congress was concerned that the future value of creative works 
would be difficult to predict and that authors are often the party less experienced in 
publishing matters and with less leverage in bargaining for terms.
46
  These rights aim to 
protect the author as a disadvantaged party by allowing a later opportunity to renegotiate 
and “cash in” on the work’s success.
47
  Because the law was enacted in 1978 and does not 
apply retroactively to agreements entered into before that date, rights holders will be able 
to begin terminating contracts under this rule as of 2013.
48
  Depending on how courts 
interpret this provision,
49
 the resulting effects could in many ways be comparable to the 
situation in post-reform Germany.
50
 
¶16  This Article demonstrates that the reasoning for introducing author termination 
rights in the United States is similar to other countries’ reasons for choosing a strict 
allocation of new use rights.
51
  But first, it turns to the basic legal construction for the 
rights to unknown uses in pre-reform Germany. 
B. Germany 
¶17  Prior to its reform in 2008, the German Copyright Act explicitly prohibited the 
licensing of rights to new uses.  Section 31(4) established that “[t]he grant of an 
exploitation right for as yet unknown types of use and any obligations in that respect shall 
 
43
 Id. at 486 (quoting Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
44
 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7, at 85–94; Nagano, supra note 7, at 1183–92; Nakos, supra 
note 30, at 455–61; Barbara D. Griff, Note, A New Use for an Old License: Who Owns the Right?, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 82–84 (1995); Saez, supra note 34, at 371–73; Rosenzweig, supra note 34, at 920–
26; Stacey M. Byrnes, Copyright Licenses, New Technology and Default Rules: Converging Media, 
Diverging Courts?, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 243, 271–74 (2000). 
45
 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2006) (“notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”); see also 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, at § 5.4. 
46
 See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF 
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 92 (Comm. Print 1961); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
47
 But see Loren, supra note 10, at 1345–46 (arguing that the law mainly addresses the issue of high 
uncertainty surrounding the future success of creative works as a problem faced by both parties). 
48
 This also pertains to the rules for contracts entered into before 1978, which grant a termination right 
after fifty-six years in some cases and seventy-five years in others (for the two times that the duration of the 
copyright term was extended, authors are allowed a termination right for prior contracts after the original 
copyright term length). See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), (d). 
49
 The U.S. Supreme Court has already confirmed the inalienability of the right in Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 230 (1990). See Loren, supra note 10, at 1331.  However, other decisions have been ambivalent 
regarding the possibility of preempting the right by terminating the initial agreement and entering into a 
new one before the termination period has been reached. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 10, at 227–40. 
50
 See discussion infra Part IV.B.4. 
51
 Infra Part III. 
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have no legal effect.”
52
  This strict protection of new use rights, although not statutorily 
introduced until the 1960s, was a codification of judicially developed rules that began 
restricting rights transfers as early as the beginning of the twentieth century.
53
  In a 
prominent case in 1927, the German Federal Court of Justice denied a publisher the film 
rights to the operetta Das Musikantenmädel,
54
 even though film technology was known 
(albeit not widespread) at the time, and the broadly worded contract clause covered the 
rights to the text and stage directions “for all times and with all current and future derived 
rights, including all translation and performance rights, as well as the rights of stage 
operation and performance for all countries.”
55
 
¶18  Two years later, the German Federal Court of Justice decided that a publisher did 
not have control over the broadcasting rights to the creations of Wilhelm Busch, despite a 
contract assigning the company the full copyright to all of his works.
56
  In a following 
case concerning gramophone record rights in 1931,
57
 the court validated the grant, 
reasoning that it pertained to a closely related advancement of previous distribution 
methods.  This argument, in effect, confirmed that not all uses were covered by the 
blanket clause granting the “irrevocable exclusive authorization to exploit all held rights 
using currently known or yet to be invented mechanical music instruments of all kinds 





 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] [Copyright Act], 
Sept. 9, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] I at 1273, § 31(4) (as adopted in 1965) (Ger.).  “Exploitation 
right” is a continental European term covering use and distribution of a copyrighted work. 
53
 Artur-Axel Wandtke & Eike Wilhelm Grunert, § 31 Ein räumung von Nutzungsrechten, in 
PRAXISKOMMENTAR ZUM URHEBERRECHT [PRACTITIONER’S COMMENTARY ON COPYRIGHT LAW] 422 
(Artur-Axel Wandtke & Winifried Bullinger eds., 2d ed. 2006) (Ger.); STEFAN DREWES, NEUE 
NUTZUNGSARTEN IM URHEBERRECHT [NEW USES IN COPYRIGHT LAW] 28–37 (2002) (Ger.); KERSTIN A. 
ZSCHERPE, ZWEITVERWERTUNGSRECHTE UND § 31 ABS. 4 URHG: EINE KRITISCHE ANALYSE [COPYRIGHT 
COLLECTIVES AND § 31 PARA. 4 OF THE COPYRIGHT CODE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS] 29 (2004) (Ger.); Stefan 
Lütje, Die unbekannte Nutzungsart im Bereich der Filmwerke—alles Klimbim? [The Unknown Use in the 
Area of Cinematic Works—Always Klimbim (Fuss and Bother)?], in AKTUELLE RECHTSPROBLEME DER 
FILMPRODUKTION UND FILMLIZENZ: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLF SCHWARZ ZU SEINEM 80. GEBURTSTAG 
[CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FILM PRODUCTION AND FILM LICENSE: COMMEMORATING WOLF SCHWARZ 
ON HIS 80TH BIRTHDAY] 115, 116 (Jürgen Becker & Mathias Schwarz eds., 1999) (Ger.); see also infra 
Part III.A. 
54
 Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 29, 1927, 118 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 282 (Ger.). 
55
 Id. at 285 (“[F]ür alle Zeiten und mit allen gegenwärtig und künftig fliessenden Rechten, auch den 
sämtlichen Übersetzungs- und Aufführungsrechten, sowie dem Rechte des Bühnenbetriebs und der 
Aufführung für alle Länder.”).  All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. 
56
 RG Feb. 16, 1929, 123 RGZ 312 (Ger.). 
57
 RG Nov. 14, 1931, 134 RGZ 198 (Ger.). 
58
 Id. at 199 (“[U]nwiderrufliche ausschliessliche Vollmacht zur Ausnutzung aller ihrer Rechte bei jetzt 
bekannten oder noch zu erfindenden mechanischen Musikinstrumenten aller Art . . . und aller ihrer 
kinematographischen Rechte.”). Two other prominent cases in the 1960s concerned Curt Goetz’s 
filmography works.  The first involved a similar dispute on whether the television rights had been granted 
along with the general film rights (finding they had not), and the second did not deal directly with the issue 
of unknown distribution methods, but confirmed the restrictive interpretation of copyright agreements in 
general. Curt-Goetz-Filme II, BGH Oct. 2, 1968, GRUR 143, 1969 (Ger.); Curt-Goetz-Filme III, BGH Oct. 
2, 1968, GRUR 364, 1969 (Ger.).  Other noteworthy cases include the German Federal Court of Justice 
decision Keine Ferien für den lieben Gott, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 16, 
1959, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 197, 1960 (Ger.), in which the court 
decided that a clause granting the “exclusive substandard film exploitation rights in their entirety” did not 
include the television rights to the movie. Furthermore, although a later German Federal Court of Justice 
decision allowed for expansion to television based on a contract clause that granted the rights to “[A]ll 
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¶19  After the explicit establishment of § 31(4) in the Copyright Act, German courts 
continued to confirm the prohibition in subsequent cases.  Prominent examples include 
Videozweitauswertung,
59
 in which the German Federal Court of Justice concluded that 
the copyright to the new VHS technology was not transferred in a 1968 license granting 
the rights to all known and future uses and Spiegel-CD-ROM,
60
 finding that, based on 
§ 31(4) of the 1965 Copyright Act, the publication rights to newspaper articles did not 
extend to CD-ROM technology. In the years prior to the reform, cases favored less 
restrictions on expansion into other media, as courts increasingly declared technological 
advancements not to be “unforeseen” or “new” uses in a legal sense.
61
  In the mid-1990s, 
the German Federal Court of Justice began to establish the practice of allowing “risk 
agreements” (Risikogeschäfte) that covered technically known but, at the time, 
economically unimportant distribution methods.
62
  This stood in contrast to its previous 
practice of requiring that “known” technology be economically meaningful.
63
  Although 
these tendencies lessened the restriction on new use right grants, the prohibition 
continued to be upheld for significant technology advancements that were not invented at 




ways, systems, and methods known at the time of the contract, and all ways, systems, and methods not yet 
found and invented at the time of the contract, in particular film broadcast and color film,” the court 
justified this decision solely through a wide interpretation of the term “film broadcast,” confirming that the 
blanket clause covering uninvented methods was invalid. Alverträge, BGH May 13, 1982, GRUR 727, 
1982 (Ger.). 
59
 BGH Oct. 11, 1990, GRUR 133 (135–36), 1991 (Ger.). 
60
 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Nov. 5, 1998, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 
225, 1999 (Ger.), aff’d by BGH July 5, 2001, 148 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTS IN 
ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 221 (Ger.) (the court focused on the “purpose of grant” rule 
(Zweckübertragungsregel) in the original version of the Copyright Act, UrhG Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I at 
1273, § 31(5) (as adopted in 1965) (Ger.)); see also, e.g., OLG Oct. 10, 1995, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT-RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT, ZIVIRECHT [NJW-RR] 420, 1996 (Ger.) (finding a CD to be 
a new use compared to records and cassette tapes); see also Kassettenfilm, BGH Apr. 26, 1974, GRUR 
786, 1974 (Ger.) (leaving the question of new use open, but invoking the purpose of grant rule to find that a 
1966 license granting all broadcast and film rights does not include distribution of super-8 cassettes). 
61
 See Lütje, supra note 53, at 115. 
62
 Videozweitauswertung III, BGH Jan. 26, 1995, 128 BGHZ 336 (Ger.); EROC III, BGH Oct. 10, 2002, 
GRUR 234, 2003 (Ger.); Klimbim, BGH July 4, 1996, 133 BGHZ 281 (Ger.); Der Zauberberg, BGH May 
19, 2005, 163 BGHZ 109 (Ger.); see also GERHARD SCHRICKER, URHEBERRECHT: KOMMENTAR 
[COPYRIGHT LAW: COMMENTARY] 657 (3d ed. 2006) (Ger.); MANFRED REHBINDER, URHEBERRECHT: EIN 
STUDIENBUCH [COPYRIGHT LAW: A STUDY GUIDE] 214 (15th rev. ed. 2008) (Ger.); Gernot Schulze, § 31a 
Verträge über unbekannte Nutzungsarten, in THOMAS DREIER & GERNOT SCHULZE, 
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ: URHEBERRECHTSWAHRNEHMUNGSGESETZ KUNSTURHEBERGESETZ: KOMMENTAR 
545, 557–59 (3d ed. 2008) (Ger.); ULRICH LOEWENHEIM, HANDBUCH DES URHEBERRECHTS [COPYRIGHT 
LAW HANDBOOK] 1263–64 (2d ed. 2010) (Ger.); infra Part IV.B.6. 
63
 See, e.g., GEMA Vermutung I, BGH June 5, 1985, 95 BGHZ 274 (275) (Ger.); GEMA-Vermutung 
IV, BGH Oct. 15, 1987, GRUR 296 (298), 1988 (Ger.); Videozweitauswertung I, BGH Oct. 11, 1990, 
GRUR 133 (136), 1991 (Ger.); see also PHILIPP MÖHRING & KÄTE NICOLINI, URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ 
[COPYRIGHT ACT] 231 (1970) (Ger.). 
64
 See, e.g., Spiegel-CD-ROM, OLG Nov. 5, 1998, MMR 225, 1999 (Ger.); Video-on-demand, OLG 
Mar. 19, 1998, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 413 (416), 1998 (Ger.); 
Elektronische Zeitung im Internet, OLG May 11, 2000, ZUM 870, 2000 (Ger.); Fernsehproduktion im 
Internet, Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Mar. 10, 1999, MMR 291, 2000 (Ger.); EROC III, BGH Oct. 
10, 2002, GRUR 234 (235), 2003 (Ger.) (not denying that CD could be a new use, despite much 
controversy in lower courts and commentary); see also OLE JANI, DER BUY-OUT-VERTRAG IM 
URHEBERRECHT [THE BUY-OUT CONTRACT IN COPYRIGHT LAW] 107 (2003) (Ger.); Jan Bernd Nordemann, 
Die erlaubte Einräumung von Rechten für unbekannte Nutzungsarten [The Permissible Appropriation of 
Rights for Unknown Uses], in COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 193, 206 
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¶20  In 2008, a reform introduced a new regime for new use right grants.  It abolished 
Section 31(4) and officially allowed the transfer of rights to unknown uses of copyrighted 
works. The reform, however, also introduced an inalienable revocation right, whereby 
authors are able to revoke the grant within three months after the publisher notifies them 
of a new distribution method.
65
  Because Germany restricted new use right grants for 
nearly a century before deciding to overturn this rule, it is a particularly interesting 
example to examine in this context.  The long history of restricting new use right grants 
in Germany is different from the approach of other legal systems, such as that of the 
United States. 
C. France 
¶21  The French Intellectual Property Code contains no explicit prohibition of 
transferring rights to unknown uses of a copyrighted work.  Interestingly, despite strict 
regulations governing the content and scope of copyright agreements,
66
 the Code contains 
a provision that explicitly allows for a grant of rights to unforeseen uses.  Article L. 131-6 
states:  “Any assignment clause affording the right to exploit a work in a form that is 
unforeseeable and not foreseen on the date of the contract shall be explicit and shall 
stipulate participation correlated to the profits from exploitation.”
67
  At first glance, this 
provision is seemingly the opposite of the clear prohibition found in other European 
countries.  Although the provision requires an explicit contract clause and a profit 
participation agreement, it does not prevent the author from signing away the rights to 
unforeseen uses.  However, French commentary and case law indicates that the 
applicability of this provision is somewhat restricted.  As implied by the wording of the 
clause, Article L. 131-6 intends to cover two types of unforeseeability:  (1) 
unforeseeability in the sense that it was impossible for anyone to know of the future use 
at the time of the contract (non prévisible) and (2) unforeseeability in the sense that the 
use already existed at the time, but was unforeseen by the contracting parties (non 
prévue).
68
  However, the French Intellectual Property Code also has a specification 
requirement in Article L. 131-3 which states:  “Transfer of authors’ rights shall be subject 




 The specifics of the reform and the developments that led to this change are discussed in more detail 
infra Part IV.B.6. 
66
 See ANDRÉ LUCAS, PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE [LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY] 95, 
97 (4th ed. 2010) (Fr.); PIERRE-YVES GAUTIER, PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE [LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC PROPERTY] 534 (6th ed. 2007) (Fr.); FRÉDÉRIC POLLAUD-DULIAN, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR 
[COPYRIGHT LAW] 582–84 (2005) (Fr.). 
67
 Loi 92-597 du 1 julliet 1992 relative au code de la proprété intellectuelle [Law 92-597 of July 1, 1992 
on the Intellectual Property Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 3, 1992, p. 8801, art. L. 131-6, translated in Intellectual Property Code: 
Legislative Part, LEGIFRANCE, http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_35.pdf (last updated Sept. 15, 2003).  The 
continental European term “exploitation” covers use and distribution of copyrighted works. See supra note 
52. 
68
 See HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE [COPYRIGHT LAW IN FRANCE] 641 (3d ed. 1978) 
(Fr.); CLAUDE COLOMBET, PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE ET DROITS VOISINS [COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS] 235 (8th ed. 1997) (Fr.). 
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and the field of exploitation of the assigned rights being defined as to its scope and 
purpose, as to place and as to duration.”
69
 
¶22  The specification requirement clearly stipulates that a transfer of rights must 
explicitly list each individual distribution method in the contract.
70
  As a result, Article L. 
131-6 cannot pertain to uses that were merely unforeseen by the parties but only pertains 
to uses that were entirely unanticipated because they did not exist at the time.
71
  But 
herein lays another problem:  distribution methods that are entirely unforeseen will 
generally be unable to meet the explicit description requirement because the 
circumstances and scope of unforeseen distribution methods are, in most cases, 
impossible to define.
72
  Additionally, the requirement of agreeing on a correlated share of 
the profits may render the grant ineffective as well, since the practical feasibility of such 
a share is not at all clear at the time of the contract.
73
  As a result, much of the literature 
regards the applicable scope of Article L. 131-6 as either insignificantly small
74




¶23  A considerably limited application of Article L. 131-6 also seems in line with the 
contract-regulating rules found in the French Intellectual Property Code.  For example, 
copyright agreements are subject to the principle of restrictive interpretation set forth in 
Article L. 122-7, which requires agreements purporting a full transfer of rights to remain 
strictly limited to the distribution methods determined by the contract.
76
. It seems 
contradictory to Article L. 122-7 and with Article L. 131-3 (requiring the author’s 
explicit permission)
77
 to allow a liberal application of Article L. 131-6, especially 
considering the legislative reasoning behind these restrictive principles.
78
  
¶24  There are few court cases concerning Article L. 131-6 (or its predecessor).79  The 
most prominent decision, Plurimédia, involved journalists that contested the online 
 
69
 Law 92-597 of of July 1, 1992, art. L. 131-3 (Fr.). 
70
 See POLLAUD-DULIAN, supra note 66, at 583; HERBERT SCHADEL, DAS FRANZÖSISCHE 
URHEBERVERTRAGSRECHT [THE FRENCH COPYRIGHT CONTRACT LAW] 29 (1966) (Ger.). 
71
 See DESBOIS, supra note 68, at 641; POLLAUD-DULIAN, supra note 66, at 589; SCHADEL, supra note 
70, at 29. 
72
 See Roger Fernay, La cession et le contrat d’édition [The Assignment and Publishing Contract], 19 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR [RIDA] 257, 295 (1958) (Fr.); COLOMBET, supra note 68, at 
235. 
73
 See POLLAUD-DULIAN, supra note 66, at 590; SCHADEL, supra note 70, at 29; see also DREWES, supra 
note 53, at 95; Frédérique Genton, Multimedia im französischen Urheberrecht: der zweite Sirinelli-Bericht 
[Multimedia in French Copyright Law: The Second Sirinelli Report], 6 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT.] 693, 696 (1996) (Ger.) (discussing the 
problems of the financial evaluation of multimedia works under French law). 
74
 See DESBOIS, supra note 68, at 641; SCHADEL, supra note 70, at 28–29. 
75
 See COLOMBET, supra note 68, at 235; DREWES, supra note 53, at 95–96; Fernay, supra note 72, at 
295. 
76
 See Law 92-597 of July 1, 1992 on the Intellectual Property Code, J.O., July 3, 1992, p. 8801, art. L. 
122-7 (Fr.), translated in Intellectual Property Code: Legislative Part, LEGIFRANCE, 
http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_35.pdf (last updated Sept. 15, 2003) (“Where a contract contains the 
complete transfer of either of the rights referred to in this Article, its effect shall be limited to the 
exploitation modes specified in the contract.”); LUCAS, supra note 66, at 97; see also POLLAUD-DULIAN, 
supra note 66, at 583. 
77
 GAUTIER, supra note 66, at 534–35; LUCAS, supra note 66, at 97; POLLAUD-DULIAN, supra note 66, at 
583–84. 
78
 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
79
 The predecessor to Article L. 131-6 is Loi 57-298 du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriété littéraire et 
artistique [Law 57-298 of March 11, 1957 on Literary and Artistic Property], J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, 
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publication of articles that were originally published in a printed newspaper.
80
  The court 
ruled that the online use of the articles was an unforeseen distribution method and that the 
rights to this method were not transferred because there was neither an explicit 
contractual clause covering new uses nor any stipulated profit participation thereof.
81
  
Although this decision confirms the basic restrictions found in the wording of Article L. 
131-6, it does little to reveal how much further these restrictions may reach in practice.  
The court makes no further comment on the scope or applicability of the norm.
82
  In a 
similar case, Le Figaro,
83
 journalists again complained that they had not granted 
permission for the online publication of their articles.  Again, the court found no explicit 
agreement to the contrary and decided in favor of the journalists.
84
 
¶25  It is unclear why the legislature introduced Article L. 131-6 at all.  The legislative 
history does not provide a completely satisfying explanation.  The provision first 
appeared as Article 38 of the Law of 1957, with no change in wording when it was 
incorporated into the current act as Article L. 131-6. The preparatory documentation of 
the 1957 Law sheds little light on the provision’s reasoning.  An extra-parliamentary 
commission introduced the provision relatively late in the process, without explaining the 
rationale or precise meaning.  It generated no recorded debate.
85
  According to some 
speculation, the provision’s originated as a requirement that authors explicitly approve 
every new use, as set forth by a draft law from 1936.
86
  The provision in the draft law was 
apparently intended to legislatively counteract a decision by the French Supreme Court 
for Judicial Matters in 1930,
87
 which found a contract made prior to the invention of the 
gramophone record to include the right to distribute the work using this new method.  
However, earlier case law established that the use of new distribution methods requires 
an explicit agreement.
88
  Because the decision was not in accordance with prior case law, 
the legislature may have felt the need to implement a unifying provision.  The court may 
have simply overlooked the basic underlying concern, which had already been 
comprehensively addressed by other provisions in the course of the reform.
89
 
¶26  Despite the lack of illuminating case law on Article L. 131-6 or its predecessor, 
French courts have indeed confirmed the strict treatment of contract clauses with regard 
 
art. 38 (Fr.), translated in Intellectual Property Code: Legislative Part, LEGIFRANCE, 
http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code_35.pdf (last updated Sept. 15, 2003). 
80
 See id.  
81
 Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Strasbourg, Feb. 3, 1998, 
JCP 1998, II, 10044 (Fr.), translated in Symposium on Electronic Rights in International Perspective, 22 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS app. at 199 (1998). 
82
 In fact, it bases much of its decision on provisions found in employment law and the collective labor 
agreement between the parties. 
83
 TGI Paris, Apr. 14, 1999, Légipresse 162, I, 69 & 162, III, 81 (Fr.). 
84
 Id.; see also Betrand Delcros, France: Journalists’ Copyright and the Internet, IRIS, May 1999, at 3, 
available at http://www.obs.coe.int/iris_online/iris_1999/5.pdf. 
85
 See DESBOIS, supra note 68, at 641. 
86
 See DREWES, supra note 53, at 94; see also Draft Law, in JEAN ESCARRA, JEAN RAULT & FRANÇOIS 
HEPP, LA DOCTRINE FRANÇAISE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR: ETUDE CRITIQUE A PROPOS DE PROJETS RECENTS SUR 
LE DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LE CONTRAT D’EDITION app. [THE FRENCH DOCTRINE OF COPYRIGHT: CRITICAL 
REVIEW ABOUT THE RECENT DRAFTS TO THE LAW ON COPYRIGHT AND PUBLISHING CONTRACTS] (2d ed. 
1937) (Fr.). 
87
 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], May 10, 1930, D.P. 1932, I, 29 (Fr.). 
88
 See DREWES, supra note 53, at 96. 
89
 See id. at 95. 
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to the restrictive interpretation principle set forth in Article L. 122-7 and the specification 
requirement set forth in Article L. 131-3.  Overly broad clauses that purport to grant all 
rights generally violate these provisions and would likely be rendered void.
90
  The French 
Supreme Court for Judicial Matters has held that distribution methods without explicitly 
defined scope and purpose are not part of the contract and constitute infringement
91
 and 
that clauses such as “all rights included” (tous droits compris) are invalid.
92
  Furthermore, 
the principle of strict interpretation has led French courts to favor journalists in the many 
controversial cases of online publication rights.
93
 
¶27  Thus, France, like pre-reform Germany, employs a generally restrictive approach 
toward new use right grants.  Right transfers in copyright agreements are subject to strict 
rules of interpretation—courts tend to invalidate clauses that are worded broadly, as 
grants of unknown use rights generally must be. 
D. Summary 
¶28  This Part shows that France and pre-reform Germany have a restrictive approach to 
new use right grants.  Broadly worded contract clauses that assign the rights to all future 
and unknown uses of a work are invalidated, generally preventing publishers from using 
unforeseen distribution methods without regaining explicit permission.  While such 
copyright license restrictions are common in Europe, there are other legal systems with 
less regulation regarding new uses.  The United States permits the voluntary transfer of 
unknown use rights, but such transfers are subject to author termination rights.  The next 
Part explores the reasoning behind restraining the grant of rights to new uses in France 
and pre-reform Germany in order to understand the legislatures’ desired goals. 
III. LEGISLATIVE REASONING 
¶29  The official legislative reasoning behind limiting the contractual freedom of the 
parties to known uses of a work is commonly distributive:  according to lawmakers in 
countries that prohibit the grant of new use rights, the main goal is to allocate to authors 
the financial returns of their artistic works.  This aim is regularly based on societal 
preferences, such as notions of fairness.
94
  Although creators initially have control over 
their copyright,
95
 some fear that creators might transfer their rights to new uses to 
publishers because creators face a variety of bargaining disadvantages when negotiating 
 
90
 See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Feb. 20, 1981 (Fr.); see also POLLAUD-
DULIAN, supra note 66, at 584; Netanel, supra note 29, at 68. 
91
 Cass., 1e civ., Nov. 28, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No. 308 (Fr.). 
92
 Cass., 1e civ., Bull. civ. I, No. 2536 (Fr.). 
93
 See, e.g., CA Paris, 22e ch., June 9, 2009, 51 Revue Lamy droit de l’immatériel 2009, 1671 (Fr.); Le 
Progrès, TGI Lyon, July 21, 1999, Légipresse 166, I, 132 & 166, III, 156 (Fr.); see also Plurimédia, TGI 
Strasbourg, Feb. 3, 1998, Légipresse 149, I, 19 & 149, III, 22 (Fr.), translated in 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 199 (1998); Le Figaro, TGI Paris, Apr. 14, 1999, Légipresse 162, I, 69 & 162, III, 81 (Fr.); LUCAS, 
supra note 66, at 98. 
94
 The non-distributive economic argument of giving artists the returns from their works in order to 
incentivize artistic creation does not seem prevalent.  Instead, legislative reasoning commonly follows 
natural rights theories. See infra Parts III.A-B. 
95
 Legal systems that prohibit new use right grants generally do not employ a “work made for hire” 
doctrine as is known to U.S. copyright law. 
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with publishers.  Therefore, they deem legal intervention necessary to ensure that authors 
are not “cheated” out of the intended wealth distribution.  This Part traces the historical 
development of restrictions on transfers of new use rights in Germany and France and 
brings to light the intent and reasoning of the legislatures and courts behind implementing 
and upholding this contractual restriction. 
¶30  To better understand the distributional reasoning for legal rules pertaining to the 
transfer of copyrights, it is helpful to summarize how and why these rights were allocated 
to authors in the first place.
96
  Tracing these underlying principles helps to explain why 
many European countries have a strong focus on protecting authors and allocating wealth 
in their copyright laws.
97
  This Part, therefore, briefly delves into the history of how 
copyrights initially emerged in Germany and France before it addresses the developments 
that led to the restrictions on transferring new use rights. 
A. Germany 
¶31  The first copyright protection in Germany came in the form of the privilege system.  
Local sovereigns granted letterpress printers (and later publishers) a temporary exclusive 
monopoly to prevent competitors from eroding the gains from their investments.
98
  This 
system was abolished at the end of the nineteenth century, and philosophers began to 
propagate the concept of an author’s moral rights, arguing that the author’s intellectual 
property should comprise the right to control all reproduction and dissemination of the 
work.
99
  As a result of this movement, new laws towards the end of the nineteenth 






 What may seem logical today, in a legal world that automatically grants authors intellectual property, 
is based on entitlement choices which legal systems have made over the last two centuries.  These are 
allocations that could just as well have been made differently. Indeed, looking at the history of copyright 
law, one finds that although the legal result—allocating distribution rights to the creators of artistic 
works—is quite similar across borders, the reasoning on which different countries have based their choices 
varies considerably. 
97
 In other countries, such as the United States, the law has a slightly different history and purpose.  U.S. 
copyright scholars may therefore find the premise of European copyright law of interest. 
98
 This form of copyright protection was employed in the fifteenth and sixteenth century in Italy, 
Germany, France, England, and other European countries. See ELIZABETH ARMSTRONG, BEFORE 
COPYRIGHT: THE FRENCH BOOK-PRIVILEGE SYSTEM, 1498–1526, at 1–10 (1990); EUGEN ULMER, 
URHEBER- UND VERLAGSRECHT [COPYRIGHT LAW AND PUBLISHING] 51 (3d ed. 1980) (Ger.). 
99
 In reference to propositions made by Immanuel Kant, see JOHANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI & FELIX 
DAHN, DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT [GERMAN PRIVATE LAW] 113 (3d ed. 1864) (Ger.); 1 OTTO GIERKE, 
DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT [GERMAN PRIVATE LAW] 762–66 (1895) (Ger.); ULMER, supra note 98, at 109–
10. 
100
 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Schriftwerken, Abbildungen, musikalischen Kompositionen 
und dramatischen Werken [Law on the Copyright of Written Works, Pictures, Musical Compositions, and 
Dramatic Works], June 11, 1870, BGBL. I at 339 (Ger.); Kunstschutzgesetz [Art Conservation Act], Jan. 9, 
1876, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] I at 4 (Ger.); Photographieschutzgesetz [Photography Protection Act], 
Jan. 10, 1876, RGBL. I at 8 (Ger.); Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der 
Tonkunst [LUG] [Law Relating to Copyright in Works of Literature and Music], June 19, 1901, RGBL. I at 
227 (Ger.); Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der bildenden Künste und der Photographie 
[KUG] [Law Relating to Copyright in Works of Fine Art and Photography], Jan. 9, 1907, RGBL. I at 27 
(Ger.).  Although another reason that this was politically possible was that the printers and publishers were 
also strongly in favor of a conception of authors’ rights.  For one, the territorial fragmentation of the 
country meant obtaining printing rights from many different local lordships, most of which charged high 
monopoly fees.  Furthermore, the sovereigns were using the privilege system as a means of censorship by 
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¶32  Proponents of authors’ moral rights regarded the protection of fiscal interests as a 
logical emanation of the basic right.
101
  The German Federal Court of Justice officially 
recognized the author’s right to compensation for the use of his work in a 1926 
decision,
102
 holding that the purpose of copyright was to allocate to the creator the 
monetary proceeds derived from a copyrighted work.  The concept of granting authors 
the financial returns to their creations was confirmed by further case law
103
 and finally 
established statutorily by new copyright laws in 1965, which granted all distribution 
rights to the author,
104
 including the rights to future unknown uses of the work.
105
  Thus, 
next to ideological interests, the main function of German copyright law, since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, has been to secure for creators the financial returns 
generated by their work.
106
 
¶33  When authors became legally entitled to the economic benefits derived from the 
use and distribution of their works at the end of the nineteenth century, their rights were 
initially fully transferable by contract (“translative”).
107
  However, the natural rights 
movement soon introduced the concept of a moral connection between author and 
creation.  According to the monistic theory developed by German legal scholars, the 
material and immaterial interests protected by copyright were inextricably intertwined.
108
  
The resulting theory of constitutive transfer,
109
 which holds that copyright is never fully 
transferable,
110
 leaves the author with some moral and monetary authority despite 




supervising and controlling printed media.  Vesting reproduction rights in the authors would allow the 
printers and publishers to exclusively obtain these rights through contract, thereby granting them protection 
from competitors without leaving them at the mercy of the regional lords. 
101
 ULMER, supra note 98, at 110; GIERKE, supra note 99, at 766. 
102
 Der Tor und der Tod, RG May 12, 1926, 113 RGZ 413 (418) (Ger.). 
103
 Grundig-Reporter, BGH May 18, 1955, 17 BGHZ 266 (Ger.). 
104
 UrhG, Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I at 1273, § 15 (as adopted in 1965) (Ger.); see also Begründung zum 
Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Urheberrechte und verwandte Schutzrechte, Mar. 23, 1962, DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHE [BT] IV/270 (Ger.). 
105
 BT IV/270, at 45.  
106
 See Schulbuch, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 7, 1971, 31 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 229 (240) (Ger.); see also Schulze, 
supra note 62, at 556. 
107
 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Schriftwerken, Abbildungen, musikalischen Kompositionen 
und dramatischen Werken, BUNDES-GESETZBLATT DES NORDDEUTSCHEN BUNDES 339 § 3 (1870) (Ger.) 
(“Das Recht des Urhebers geht auf dessen Erben über.  Dieses Recht kann beschränkt oder unbeschränkt 
durch Vertrag oder durch Verfügung von Todes wegen auf andere übertragen werden.”).  Similar 
paragraphs can be found in the Art Conservation Act (Ger.); Photography Protection Act (Ger.); LUG 
§ 8(3) (Ger.); KUG § 10(3) (Ger.); see also MÖHRING & NICOLINI, supra note 63, at 223; ZSCHERPE, supra 
note 53, at 22. 
108
 See ULMER, supra note 98, at 116; HAIMO SCHACK, URHEBER- UND URHEBERVERTRAGSRECHT 
[COPYRIGHT AND COPYRIGHT CONTRACT LAW] 62 (5th rev. ed. 2010) (Ger.). 
109
 ULMER, supra note 98, at 359; GIERKE, supra note 99, at 762–66; SCHACK, supra note 108, at 170–
72.  For case law, see Wilhelm Busch, RG Feb. 16, 1929, 123 RGZ 312 (320) (Ger.). 
110
 ZSCHERPE, supra note 53, at 22; Philipp Möhring, Urheberrechtsverwertungsverträge in der Sicht 
der Urheberrechtsreform [Copyright Contracts in View of Copyright Law Reform], in DAS RECHT AM 
GEISTESGUT: STUDIEN ZUM URHEBER-, VERLAGS- UND PRESSERECHT: EIN FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WALTER 
BAPPERT [THE LAW ON INTELLECTUAL GOODS: STUDIES OF COPYRIGHT, PUBLISHING AND MEDIA LAW: A 
COMMEMORATIVE PUBLICATION FOR WALTER BAPPERT] 129, 130–31 (Fritz Hodeige ed., 1964) (Ger.). 
111
 MÖHRING & NICOLINI, supra note 63, at 224; STEFAN SCHWEYER, DIE 
ZWECKÜBERTRAGUNGSTHEORIE IM URHEBERRECHT [THE PURPOSE OF TRANSFER THEORY IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW] 16 (1982) (Ger.). 
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¶34  The issue of which rights authors could assign soon became a question of 
legislative importance.  Publishers quickly adopted contract clauses that assigned 
publishers all economic rights over the author’s work,
112
 including rights to uses 
unknown at the time of the contract.
113
  Discussing the 1900 legislation, some legislators 
expressed concern that inexperienced authors might sign away all their rights without 
understanding the magnitude and consequences of their legal actions.
114
  Much of the 
literature over the next decades advocated a very restrictive interpretation of licensing 
contracts.
115
  The publisher was to have only the rights that were explicitly granted in the 
contract or were necessary to fulfill the joint purpose of the contract.
116
  These principles 




¶35  Over the first half of the twentieth century, German courts extensively adopted 
these restrictive interpretation principles in the above-mentioned new use decisions, 
favoring authors and declaring sweeping, generalized clauses in copyright agreements to 
be void.
118
  Because blanket clauses covering all distribution methods were no longer 
allowed, granting another person the rights to unknown uses of a work became de facto 
impossible.  The copyright reform of 1965 finally codified the judicially developed 
principles of restrictive contract interpretation
119
 by explicitly forbidding the grant of 
rights to unknown distribution methods.  The courts had based their practice of restricting 
new use right grants on the above-described fundamental principle of German copyright 
 
112
 ULMER, supra note 98, at 386; Eugen Ulmer, Das neue deutsche Urheberrechtsgesetz [The New 
German Copyright Act], 45 ARCHIV FÜR URHEBER-, FILM-, FUNK-, UND THEATERRECHT [UFITA] 184, 288, 
291, 294 (1965) (Ger.); see also MÖHRING & NICOLINI, supra note 63, at 224. 
113
 DREWES, supra note 53, at 26, 46. 
114
 See Bericht der elften Kommission über den Entwurf eines Gesetzes, betreffend das Urheberrecht an 
Werken der Literatur und der Tonkunst, BT 97/214, at 1281 (Ger.).  Part of the commission even wanted to 
introduce a written specification obligation for all uses transferred in the contract.  This was rejected due to 
its incompatibility with the principles of interpreting contracts in good faith. See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BGBL. I at 2909, § 157 (Ger.). 
115
 See PHILIPP ALLFELD, KOMMENTAR ZU DEM GESETZE BETREFFEND DAS URHEBERRECHT AN WERKEN 
DER BILDENDEN KÜNSTE UND DER PHOTOGRAPHIE VOM 9. JANUAR 1907 [COMMENTARY ON THE LAW 
CONCERNING THE COPYRIGHT OF WORKS OF FINE ARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHY OF JANUARY 9, 1907], at 71 
(1908) (Ger.); ALBERT OSTERRIETH, DAS URHEBERRECHT AN WERKEN DER BILDENDEN KÜNSTE UND DER 
PHOTOGRAPHIE: GESETZ VOM 9. JANUAR § 10.C.IV (1907) (Ger.); Wenzel Goldbaum, Neues aus Theorie 
und Praxis des Urheberrechts [New Issues in the Theory and Practice of Copyright Law], 1923 GRUR 
182, 187 (Ger.). 
116
 These positions led to the development of the specification requirement (Spezifizierungspflicht) and 
purpose of transfer theory (Zweckübertragungstheorie), respectively.  They were developed mainly by 
Goldbaum. See SCHWEYER, supra note 111, at 1–2; ULMER, supra note 98, at 364; SCHACK, supra note 
108, at 296; ZSCHERPE, supra note 53, at 30–31. 
117
 SCHACK, supra note 108, at 296. 
118
 See supra Part II.B; see also SCHWEYER, supra note 111, at 18–32.  In one prominent decision that 
validated the grant, the court argued that the blanket clause covered the new use because—and only 
because—the contract included an explicit remuneration agreement. See Der Hampelmann, RG Apr. 5, 
1933, 140 RGZ 255 (257–58) (Ger.).  Had the author’s financial interests not been sufficiently protected 
with regard to the new use, then the decision would have likely fallen into line with the others and rendered 
the clause invalid. See ZSCHERPE, supra note 53, at 32.  The court thereby confirmed that the purpose of 
restricting contractual right grants was to secure authors’ participation in the financial benefits. 
119
 Such as the specification and the purpose of transfer rules. See UrhG, Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I at 1273, 
§ 31(5) (as adopted in 1965) (Ger.).  Section 29 stipulates that copyright is not transferable except in the 
case of succession upon death. See id. § 29; Begründung zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Urheberrechte 
und verwandte Schutzrechte, Mar. 23, 1962, BT IV/270, at 30, 55, 56 (Ger.). 
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law:  that authors are to be secured participation in the financial profits of their work.
120
  
Although some commented that the interdependence of distribution methods might make 
coordination for publishers difficult,
121
 there was generally little argument at the time 
regarding the adoption of § 31(4), because the new clause essentially codified what 
literature and case law had developed in practice over the previous decades.
122
  The 
official explanatory statement on preventing new use right grants was that authors should 
be able to decide whether they are willing to permit distribution over a newly developed 
medium, and at what price.
123
 
¶36  According to subsequent commentary and case law, the purpose of § 31(4) is to 
prevent authors from signing away rights of unknown economic value
124
 and to assure 
them an opportunity to participate in the proceeds from distribution methods that arise 
after they sign the contract.
125
  Although this prohibition constituted a rather severe 
restriction on the principle of freedom of contract,
126
 its introduction was justified on the 
ground that authors are at a general disadvantage in dealing with publishers and are 
therefore unable to protect their own financial interests.
127
  The literature argues that 
historically, authors have generally been the weaker contracting party and publishers 
generally stronger.  This results in considerable disparity in bargaining power between 
the two parties.
128
  In the first half of the twentieth century, publishers purchased the 
exclusive rights to artistic works at little cost and some of those works later enjoyed huge 
international success.
129
  In general, the form and terms of publishing contracts are 
considered to be one-sided, in that they are constructed solely by the publisher without 
regard for the author’s interests.
130
  Without legal intervention, many believe this practice 
 
120
 CATHARINA MARACKE, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DES URHEBERRECHTSGESETZES VON 1965 [THE 
FORMATION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1965] 729 (2003) (Ger.). 
121
 See MÖHRING & NICOLINI, supra note 63, at 225. 
122
 DREWES, supra note 53, at 40. 
123
 See BT IV/270, at 56. 
124
 SCHACK, supra note 108, at 298; WANDTKE ET AL., supra note 53, at 422; SCHRICKER, supra note 62, 
at 656–57; PHILIPP MÖHRING, KÄTE NICOLINI & HARTWIG AHLBERG, URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ: 
KOMMENTAR [COPYRIGHT ACT: COMMENTARY] 395 (Käte Nicolini & Hartwig Ahlberg eds., 2d ed. 2000) 
(Ger.); ZSCHERPE, supra note 53, at 34; Kabelfernsehen, OLG May 11, 1989, GRUR 590 (590), 1989 
(Ger.). 
125
 Gunda Dreyer, § 31 Ein räumung von Nutzungsrechten, in GUNDA DREYER ET AL., URHEBERRECHT: 
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ, URHEBERRECHTSWAHRNEHMUNGSGESETZ, KUNSTURHEBERGESETZ 420, 434 
(Hans-Joachim Zeisberg ed., 2d ed. 2009) (Ger.); Schulze, supra note 62, at 556; ANNEKE SCHUCHARDT, 
VERTRÄGE ÜBER NEUE NUTZUNGSARTEN NACH DEM “ZWEITEN KORB” [CONTRACTS FOR NEW USES AFTER 
THE “SECOND BASKET”] 28 (2008) (Ger.); ZSCHERPE, supra note 53, at 35; Klimbim, BGH July 4, 1996, 
133 BGHZ 281 (283) (Ger.); Der Zauberberg, OLG Oct. 31, 2002, GRUR 50 (53), 2003 (Ger.). 
126
 See, e.g., INITIATIVE URHEBERRECHT, STELLUNGNAHME: ENTWURF EINES ZWEITEN GESETZES ZUR 
REGELUNG DES URHEBERRECHTS IN DER INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFT [OPINION: SECOND DRAFT LAW 
GOVERNING COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY] 5 (2006) (Ger.), available at 
http://www.urheberrecht.org/topic/Korb-2/st/ra-2006-nov/teil-3/Schimmel.pdf (explaining that the principle 
of freedom of contract has been continuously confirmed through case law to be a fundamental German 
legal doctrine and is seen as an extension of the general principle of “freedom of action” in Article 2(1) of 
the German Constitution). 
127
 DREWES, supra note 53, at 47–50; CHOI, supra note 15, at 181. 
128
 ULMER, supra note 98, at 386; SCHWEYER, supra note 111, at 17. 
129
 ULMER, supra note 98, at 386. 
130
 SCHWEYER, supra note 111, at 17, 118. 
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leads to clauses that grant all-encompassing rights to the publisher, including the rights to 
uses unknown at the time of the contract.
131
 
¶37  There are various assumptions put forth as to why authors are at a bargaining 
disadvantage and fail to sufficiently represent their own interests in contractual 
agreements.  First, authors are subject to financial constraints that urge them to accept 
whatever contractual terms will offer them immediate payment.
132
  Second, the author is 
presumably more dependent on the contractual agreement than the publisher due to 
insufficient competition in the publishing industry and the practice of take-it-or-leave-it 
offers.
133
  Authors, as the economically weaker party, are thus forced to accept the 
contractual terms because they find themselves faced with the choice of granting all of 
their rights for a small—but better than nothing—fee, or not getting their work distributed 
at all.
134
  The third assumption is that authors are less experienced and less 
knowledgeable than publishers when it comes to copyright agreements.
135
  Therefore, 
publishers are generally considered to have a more powerful contracting position,
136
 
allowing them to reap most of the financial benefits that arise from distribution of 
authors’ works. 
¶38  Given this disparity between the contracting parties, freedom of contract will 
predictively lead to “undesired results.”
137
  Because the ensuing wealth distribution is not 
consistent with the legislature’s preferences,
138
 the state deems it necessary to intervene 
and restrict the grant of new use rights.
139
  The prohibition in § 31(4) was therefore 
viewed as an important instrument to protect authors from the superior bargaining 
position of the publishing industry.
140
  Section 31(4) accounted for the financial interests 
of creators and aimed to reallocate wealth from publishers to authors by improving their 
bargaining position.  The next Part discusses whether these legislative fears of 
 
131
 JANI, supra note 64, at 104; ULMER, supra note 98, at 386; ZSCHERPE, supra note 53, at 33–34; 
DREYER ET AL., supra note 125, at 434; Schulze, supra note 62, at 547; SCHWEYER, supra note 111, at 118; 
Lütje, supra note 53, at 133. 
132
 Christian C.W. Pleister, Buchverlagesverträge in den Vereinigten Staaten—ein Vergleich zu Recht 
und Praxis Deutschlands [Book Publication Contracts in the United States—A Comparison to the Law and 
Practice in Germany], 2000 GRUR INT. 673, 673 (Ger.); Gernot Schulze, § 32a Weitere Beteiligung des 
Urhebers, in DREIER & SCHULZE, supra note 62, at 609 (Ger.); Begründung zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
über Urheberrechte und verwandte Schutzrechte, Mar. 23, 1962, BT IV/270, at 57 (Ger.). 
133
 See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The Great Copyright Robbery: Rights Allocation in a Digital Environment, 
Paper Presented at N.Y.U. School of Law Conference: A Free Information Ecology in a Digital 
Environment 2, 9–10 (Mar. 31–Apr. 2, 2000), 
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/thegreatcopyrightrobbery.pdf; DREWES, supra note 53, at 47–
48. 
134
 DREWES, supra note 53, at 49. 
135
 Schulze, supra note 132, at 609; BT IV/270, at 57; DREWES, supra note 53, at 48. 
136
 Pleister, supra note 132, at 673. 
137
 ULMER, supra note 98, at 386. 
138
 See id.  The purpose of German copyright law is to protect the author’s right to the financial profits 
of her creations. See supra note 106. 
139
 ZSCHERPE, supra note 53, at 33–34; DREYER ET AL., supra note 125, at 434; see also MARACKE, 
supra note 120, at 720. 
140
 Schulze, supra note 62, at 547, 561; Gernot Schulze, Vergütungssystem und Schrankenregelungen: 
Neue Herausforderungen an den Gesetzgeber [Compensation System and Fair Use: New Challenges for 
Lawmakers], 2005 GRUR 828, 831 (Ger.); Oliver Castendyk & Jenny Kirchherr, Das Verbot der 
Übertragung von Rechten an nicht bekannten Nutzungsarten—Erste Überlegungen für eine Reform des 
§ 31 Abs. 4 UrhG [The Ban on the Transfer of Rights to Unknown Uses—Initial Considerations for a 
Reform of § 31 Para. 4 or the Copyright Act], 47 ZUM 751, 755 (2003) (Ger.). 
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unfavorable wealth distribution are justified and whether the chosen method is an 
appropriate means of rectifying the situation from an economic point of view. 
B. France 
¶39  France, like Germany, also employed a system of privileges for printers and 
publishers beginning in the sixteenth century and becoming common in the seventeenth 
century.  Its abolishment, however, came about far sooner and more abruptly than in 
fragmented Germany.
141
  On the eve of the French Revolution, the privilege system was 
disestablished in 1789 by the August decrees
142





  One of the main goals of these revolutionary laws was to grant authors literary 
and artistic property, which was deemed “the most sacred, the most legitimate, the most 
unassailable, [and] . . . the most personal of all properties,”
145
 because it stems from the 
fruits of authors’ thoughts and intellectual creativity.
146
  The laws of 1791 and 1793 
therefore explicitly assigned copyright rights to authors.
147
 
¶40  Initially, this intellectual “property” was freely transferable, either in part or 
completely.
148
  The French Supreme Court for Judicial Matters confirmed this in 1842 
and 1880, stating that, with certain exceptions unrelated to transferability, literary and 
artistic property was viewed under the law like any other form of property.
149
  However, 
 
141
 See ULMER, supra note 98, at 58. 
142
 Original documents in French printed in 1 J.M. ROBERTS, FRENCH REVOLUTION DOCUMENTS 151–53 
(1966). 
143 Dé
cret du 13–19 janvier 1791 relatif aux spectacles [Decree of January 13–19, 1791 Relating to 
Performances], COLLECTION COMPLÈTE DES LOIS, DÉCRETS, ORDONNANCES, RÉGLEMENS ET AVIS DU 
CONSEIL-D’ÉTAT [DUV. & BOC.] [COMPLETE COLLECTION OF LAWS, DECREES, ORDINANCES, 
REGULATIONS, AND NOTICES OF COUNCIL OF STATE] II, p. 174 (Fr.) (concerning the works of living 
playwrights). 
144
 Décret du 19–24 juillet 1793 relatif aux droits de propriété des auteurs, compositeurs de musique, 
peintres et dessinateurs [Decree of July 19–24, 1793 on the Property Rights of Authors, Musicians, 
Painters, and Illustrators], DUV. & BOC. VI, p. 35, art. 1 (Fr.). 
145
 LE CHAPELIER, RAPPORT FAIT: AU NOM DU COMITÉ DE CONSTITUTION, SUR LA PÉTITION DES 
AUTEURS, DRAMATIQUES, DANS LA SÉANCE DU JEUDI 13 JANVIER 1791, AVEC LE DÉCRET RENDU DANS 
CETTE SÉANCE [A REPORT OF FACTS: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON THE PETITION OF 
AUTHORS, THURSDAY JANUARY 13, 1791 WITH THE RENDERED DECREE] 16 (1971) (Fr.) (citing a 1777 
parol by the famous French lawyer Cochu), available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/documents/RapportLeChapelier.pdf (“La plus sacrée, la plus légitime, la plus 
inattaquable, [et] . . . la plus personnelle de toutes les propriétés.”). 
146
 See id.  It must be noted that this sentence, although widely cited as the origin of the author-oriented 
copyright system, is somewhat taken out of context, for Le Chapelier also strongly advocated the public 
interest in his report. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1007–08 (1990).  Indeed, the French laws of 1791 and 1793 set 
forth both the principle of authors’ rights and the principle of limiting these rights due to a public interest in 
the dissemination of artistic works. See COLOMBET, supra note 68, at 5.  It is also interesting to note that 
the first draft law which proposed to give authors legal recognition of their rights over their texts in 1790 
was motivated not only by ideological theory, but also by an attempt to stem the tide of licentious ideas 
from the press by making authors responsible for their publications. See Anne Latournerie, Petite histoire 
des batailles du droit d’auteur [Short History of Copyright Battles], 5 REVUE MULTITUDES 37, 42 (2001) 
(Fr.). 
147
 See COLOMBET, supra note 68, at 4–5 (assigning the right of representation); SCHADEL, supra note 
70, at 22–24 (assigning the right of production). 
148
 See Decree of July 19–24, 1793, art. 1 (Fr.) (“Authors . . . enjoy the exclusive right to . . . transfer 
that property in full or in part.”). 
149
 See PIERRE RECHT, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR, UNE NOUVELLE FORME DE PROPRIÉTÉ: HISTOIRE ET THÉORIE 
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around the end of the nineteenth century, many scholars began to oppose the free 
transferability of copyright on moral grounds, as part of the same natural rights 
movement that hit Germany.
150
 
¶41  As in Germany, French legal scholars and policymakers were concerned about 
bargaining disadvantages between authors and publishers.  They alleged that publishers 
were becoming increasingly cunning in their contracting, taking advantage of badly 
informed or incautious creators who were dependent on transferring their rights in order 
to distribute their works.  According to the official statement of grounds for the 1954 
draft law, it was deemed necessary to protect the proprietary interests of authors through 




¶42  This legislative preference for wealth redistribution, arising from belief in authors’ 
moral rights and the closely related goal of protecting authors’ financial interests, led to a 
number of restrictions on copyright agreements in the Copyright Law of 1957, such as 
the specification requirement.
152
  The explanatory statement accompanying the draft law 
expresses the paternalistic aim of providing authors some form of protection against 
themselves: 
The Articles 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 express to various degrees the same 
concern, namely the concern for protecting the author from his own 
incautiousness or diffidence which he sometimes displays in everyday life.  The 
prohibition of granting the rights to future works, the reconsideration of the 
contract in cases of damage, the requirement of an explicit clause for the grant of 
a right to an unforeseeable and unforeseen use of a work—be it for the same 
reason or for a different reason than that of the right to revoke the contract—all 
protect the author from the dangers vested in uncertainty over the true value, the 
possible effects, and the deficiencies of his work that can inevitably arise in the 
moment of publication.  Following this reasoning, it is regarded necessary that 
the author approve every performance, reproduction, translation, adaptation or 
rearrangement of his work.
153
 
These provisions were carried over into the current law and French legal scholars 
continue to interpret the provisions as author-protective.  According to French legal 
commentary, the paternalistic purpose of these rules is all the more important today in 
 
[THE COPYRIGHT, A NEW FORM OF PROPERTY: HISTORY AND THEORY] 50 (1969) (Fr.); see also 
COLOMBET, supra note 68, at 12. 
150
 For a detailed overview, see RECHT, supra note 149, at 61–89; see also COLOMBET, supra note 68, at 
13–14.  According to the French legal scholars at the time, the author and his creation are united by an 
intimate moral bond which should not be fully severable. See RECHT, supra note 149, at 56–57; DESBOIS, 
supra note 68, at 538; see also Netanel, supra note 29, at 16.  The French Copyright Act of 1957 codified 
this principle in Article 1(2) of the 1957 Law on Literary and Artistic Property. See generally Loi 57-298 
du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriété littéraire et artistique [Law 57-298 of March 11, 1957 on Literary and 
Artistic Property], J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 1(2); RECHT, supra note 149, at 61–89. 
151
 See Draft Law on Literary and Artistic Property of June 9, 1954, Decree of the National Convention, 
official parliament document 8618, printed in 20 UFITA 75, 80–81 (1955). 
152
 See supra Part II.C. 
153
 See Draft Law on Literary and Artistic Property of June 9, 1954, Decree of the National Convention, 
official parliament document 8618, printed in 20 UFITA 75, 81 (1955). 
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light of the increasing use of contracts of adhesion in the publishing industry:
154
  
“Creators must be protected, their consent carefully weighed, and their rights 
scrupulously respected.”
155
  The specification requirement in Article L. 131-3
156
 serves 
not only to facilitate contract interpretation, but also to prevent the author from carelessly 
assigning rights without being fully aware of their scope.
157
 
¶43  The principle of strict interpretation in Article L. 122-7 also protects authors from 
signing away unlimited rights or misjudging the scope of the assignment.
158
  The general 
protective measure resulting from these legislative fears is that an author must explicitly 
approve every method for distributing a work.  Based on this provision, many 
commentators note that grants of rights to unknown uses are generally invalid.
159
  If the 
parties list a few known distribution methods and also include a provision to cover known 
but unmentioned distribution methods, the protection intended by the specification 




¶44  Copyright law in European countries such as Germany and France places a strong 
emphasis on securing for creators the financial returns from the distribution and sale of 
their work.  Authors are often in a weaker bargaining position than publishers and 
thereby considered unable to adequately protect their financial interests in agreements 
containing new use right clauses.  Allowing the free grant of rights to unknown uses of 
copyrighted works therefore presumes to create legislatively undesirable wealth 
distribution.  Restricting the grant of new use rights aims to correct this imbalance and 
reallocate wealth to authors by restoring some of their bargaining power.  A similar 
concern is evident in the ongoing discussions over author termination rights in the United 
States.  Importantly, however, something is largely missing in most, if not all, of the 
legislative reasoning described in this Part:  consideration of the market effects of this 
legislation.  For this reason, the next Part turns to economic theory to ask whether it 
supports the distributional assumptions of the lawmakers. 
IV. LAW AND ECONOMICS 
¶45  The main reason legislatures give for intervening in the parties’ freedom of contract 
is the intuitive assumption that authors lack the means to sufficiently protect their 
financial interests when entering into copyright agreements.  Their bargaining 
disadvantage presumably results in an unequal wealth distribution that is more favorable 
to publishers.  Restrictions on grants of new use rights thus aim to redistribute some of 
this wealth to authors.  This Part looks at the legislative reasoning for this restriction from 
 
154
 GAUTIER, supra note 66, at 515. 
155
 Id. (“[L]es créateurs doivent être protégés, leur consentement soigneusement soupesé, et leurs droits 
scrupuleusement respectés.”). 
156
 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
157
 See POLLAUD-DULIAN, supra note 66, at 579; Fernay, supra note 72, at 261; COLOMBET, supra note 
68, at 257. 
158
 See POLLAUD-DULIAN, supra note 66, at 584. 
159
 See supra Part II.C. 
160
 See DESBOIS, supra note 68, at 641. 
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an economic perspective.  Part IV-A examines, and finds plausible, the assumption that 
publishers enjoy a relative greater share of distributable wealth than authors in a system 
without intervention.  Then, Parts IV-B and IV-C call into question whether the chosen 
solution is likely to achieve the intended goal of redistribution.  Part IV-D concludes that 
a variety of costs prevent authors from reaping the intended financial benefits of their 
work, and that the distributional goal of the legislature may in effect be thwarted. 
A. Distribution Effects Without Intervention 
¶46  When picturing the freelance author at the contracting mercy of the powerful media 
conglomerate, intuition may suggest that authors are getting the short end of the stick.  To 
best evaluate whether this is the case and why or why not, this Part draws upon economic 
concepts and considers the situation from a general market perspective. 
¶47  Despite the use of economic welfare theory elements, it is important for the 
purpose of this Part to distinguish between loss of wealth due to economic market failure 
and the loss of distributable wealth to authors due to bargaining disadvantages that are 
irrelevant from a classic pareto-efficiency perspective.
161
  The former case involves not 
only the author’s loss, but also deadweight loss to society, which is the main concern of 
economic welfare theory and the basis of the justification for state intervention in 
contractual freedom.
162
  The distribution effects that the legislators enacting restrictions 
on new-use-right grants are most concerned with, however, can also occur in a pareto-
optimal situation.  If the parties agree to terms that are optimal in this sense, this only 
means that they have maximized general available wealth in accordance with the first 
theorem of welfare economics;
163
 it says nothing about to whom this wealth is allocated.  
The agreement over distribution of the surplus is contingent on the “bargaining ability of 
the parties.”
164
  Even without a classic market failure, authors may therefore still lack 
leverage and get the short end of the stick.
165
  Whether this is a warranted ground for 
intervention from an economic welfare perspective, it is this issue of distribution that 
legislators are concerned with and aim to correct.  Accordingly, this Part refrains from 
general welfare evaluations and instead examines whether authors are likely to receive a 
lesser share of the distributable wealth than publishers under full freedom of contract. 
¶48  A somewhat simplifying, but realistic166 assumption is that publishers in the media 
industry are commonly large firms, whereas authors are individuals.  This Part therefore 
 
161
 Pareto efficiency is an economic welfare criterion that focuses on the joint surplus of the market 
participants.  A situation is deemed pareto-optimal when joint surplus has been maximized so that it is 
impossible to improve one party’s situation without making someone else worse off.  However, how this 
surplus is distributed among the parties is not relevant at this stage, only that it is maximized. See GLOBAL 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 217–19 (Sunil Chaudhary ed., 2009). 
162
 Although even here government intervention is not necessarily supported; especially where the 
“inevitable drawbacks” of intervention are argued to outweigh the costs of the market failure. See HENRY 
SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 419 (1883); see also BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE 
MICROECONOMICS OF MARKET FAILURES 8 (MIT Press 2000) (1998) (Fr.). 
163
 See SALANIÉ, supra note 162, at 1–4. 
164
 Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97, 97 (1982) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
165
 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE LAW 118 (7th ed. 2007). 
166
 See, e.g., INST. FOR INFO. LAW, STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS RELATING 
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: FINAL REPORT 1 (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/studies/studies_en.htm; P.B. HUGENHOLTZ & L. GUIBAULT, 
Vol. 10:7] Kate Darling 
 507 
examines the postulation that, in comparison to publishers, authors are likely to be 
subject to more budget constraints, fewer outside options, less complete (asymmetric) 
information, and increased risk aversion.  First, this Part discusses these concepts and 
their implications on the distributional outcomes of the bargaining process. 
1. Relative Budget Constraints and Standardized Contracts 
¶49  In classic economic models, individuals are often assumed to be subject to budget 
constraints, whereas firms are not.
167
  Although this assumption can be (and has been) 
criticized as not entirely realistic,
168
 it finds support in the fact that firms generally have 
much more capital at their disposal than individuals.  One reason for this is the relative 
difference in credit constraints.  In theory, market participants have the option to borrow 
against future capital, making budget constraints irrelevant.  However, there are three 
reasons why individuals are at a disadvantage in the credit market. 
¶50  First, individuals cannot easily borrow against earnings generated by human 
capital, because human capital is intangible and therefore unsuitable as collateral in credit 
markets.
169
  Second, credit markets are subject to imperfections such as incomplete 
information.  Missing knowledge about individuals and their projects can lead to moral 
hazard or adverse selection problems.
170
  This causes credit rationing by lenders, who 
may make loans contingent on the size of the borrower’s credit supply.
171
  Because firms 
regularly have larger supplies, and are therefore more likely to get loans when credit is 
rationed, this also leads to a difference between the budget constraints of firms and those 
of individuals.  Third, firms are less able to evade debt payments by moving,
172
 whereas 
individuals who move are likely to create costly locating problems for creditors.  These 
monitoring and tracking difficulties also lead to credit rationing,
173
 and higher interest 
rates for individuals have been attributed to these costs.
174
 
¶51  In sum, individuals are regularly limited by how much they can borrow, whereas 
firms are less financially constrained.  Comparing the creators of copyrighted works to 
those who profit from the works, publishing firms are typically large businesses with far 
 
INST. FOR INFO. LAW, AUTEURSCONTRACTENRECHT: NAAR EEN WETTELIJKE REGELING? [COPYRIGHT 
CONTRACT LAW: TOWARDS A STATUTORY REGULATION?] iii–iv (2004) (Neth.), available at 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/overig/auteurscontractenrecht.pdf, translation available at 
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/Summary%2005.08.2004.pdf; ALBERT N. GRECO ET AL., THE 
CULTURE AND COMMERCE OF PUBLISHING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 10–15 (2007). 
167
 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Firm in General Equilibrium Theory, in THE CORPORATE ECONOMY: 
GROWTH, COMPETITION AND INNOVATIVE POTENTIAL 68 (Robin Marris & Adrian Wood eds., 1971); see 
also Kiyoshi Kuga, Budget Constraint of a Firm and Economic Theory, 8 ECON. THEORY 137 (1996). 
168
 MICHIO MORISHIMA, CAPITAL AND CREDIT: A NEW FORMULATION OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
THEORY (1992); see also Kuga, supra note 167, at 138. 
169
 See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 93 (3d ed. 1993); George J. Stigler, Imperfections in the Capital Market, 75 J. 
POL. ECON. 287, 288 (1967). 
170
 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. 
ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1981). 
171
 Id. at 395.  
172
 Because they are comparatively immobile, but also for reasons of reputation. 
173
 See generally Stephen D. Williamson, Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium 
Credit Rationing, 18 J. MONETARY ECON. 159 (1986). 
174
 Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 35, 38 
(1993). 
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more access to credit than individual creators.  Except for a few disproportionately 
successful (or otherwise endowed) artists, the majority of authors are unlikely to have 
financial means comparable to that of most publishing firms.
175
  Unlike entities that have 
access to large reserves of capital, authors are commonly individuals engaged in high-risk 
projects and have only human capital to offer as collateral.  Authors are therefore limited 
in how much they can borrow against future earnings compared to publishers. 
¶52  That many authors are dependent on immediate income to provide for living 
expenses is often perceived as potential leverage against authors.
176
  Some might even 
argue that such asymmetric bargaining positions could give rise to economic duress, if an 
individual’s financial situation gives them no choice but to agree to the terms offered by 
the other party.
177
  Because publishing firms often use standard form contracts, authors 
could face take-it-or-leave-it offers that they are ultimately financially dependent on 
accepting.
178
  However, the mere fact that relative poverty and standard form contracts 
are common in an industry does not necessarily mean that there is asymmetrical 
bargaining power among the market participants.  In a competitive market, operating with 
standardized contracts can have benefits for everyone
179
—for instance, when the costs of 
negotiating are high.
180
  An important factor, therefore, is not whether one side has less 
capital or whether contracts can be bargained over, but rather whether there is sufficient 
competition among publishers to ensure favorable terms for authors.
181
  Under the 
assumption of perfect competition (and general perfect market conditions)
182
, budget 
constraints and contracts of adhesion alone should not affect the parties’ bargaining 
power.  However, they deserve mention, because they can weigh in quite heavily if 
certain prerequisites are missing.  Budget constraints may also influence the parties’ 
decision-making under risk, which will be discussed below.
183
  The assumption of perfect 
competition is examined in the following. 
 
175
 For empirical data on artist incomes, see RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS 
BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 79–81 (2000). 
176
 See supra Part III; see also Schulze, supra note 132, at 609; Pleister, supra note 132, at 673. 
177
 MARACKE, supra note 120, at 612; POSNER, supra note 165, at 115. 
178
 Wilhelm Nordemann, Vorschlag für ein Urhebervertragsgesetz [Proposal for a Copyright Contract 
Law], 1991 GRUR 1, 2 (Ger.); see also ULMER, supra note 98, at 386. 
179
 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. 
L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1220–25 (1983). 
180
 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 568 (3d ed. 2004); Duncan Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory 
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 616 (1982); M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of 
Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 
359, 364–65 (1976). 
181
 FARNSWORTH, supra note 180, at 572; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Column, Copyright Liability of 
Bulletin Board Operators for Infringement by Subscribers, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 71, para. 12 (1995) 
(“In a competitive market, form contract terms may simply reflect the terms the parties would have agreed 
to had they expressly negotiated a contract.”); POSNER, supra note 165, at 116. 
182
 See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing complete information as an assumption of general perfect market 
conditions). See generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 307–507 (1995); 
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 612–13 (7th ed. 2008); ROBERT COOTER 
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 224–31 (5th ed. 2008); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. 
MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 60–67 (2d ed. 
2006). 
183
 See infra Part IV.A.4. 
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2. Monopsony Power 
¶53  As discussed above, financial differences and standardized contracts are often cited 
to support the argument that authors are the weaker party in negotiating copyright 
licenses.  Although sometimes viewed as an indication of bargaining power 
asymmetry,
184
 contracts of adhesion do not immediately imply that the drafting party is 
offering unfavorable terms.
185
  The same goes for budget restrictions.  In theory, if there 
are competitors in the market, all publishers will seek to acquire authors’ rights by 
providing more attractive terms than their rivals, successively improving the standard 
offer.
186
  Therefore, so long as authors have sufficient outside options,
187
 they will not 
suffer a bargaining disadvantage solely because of the wealth disparity between 
bargaining parties or because the contract terms are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
¶54  Insufficient outside options render one party better able to refuse cooperation, 
which can cause considerable bargaining power asymmetry.
188
  According to monopsony 
theory,
189
 a lack of outside options for the seller of a good (in this case, the author) will 
lead to a lower price than would occur if the market for the seller’s services was 
competitive.
190
  This causes both a direct loss of bargaining surplus for the author and a 
general deadweight loss to society.
191
  Although no single publisher dominates the 
publishing industry, concentration of an industry to a handful of buyer entities may 
suffice to give them an advantage similar to that of a monopsony. 
¶55  This situation also occurs in comparable markets, such as labor markets.192  A low 
number of buyers in a market (also known as oligopsony) is likely to drive down the 
price and amount sold.
193
  This means that a low number of publishers would secure 
copyrights from fewer authors for lower compensation than would be offered under 
perfect competition.  The monopsony power in an oligopsony depends on the number of 
buyers and also on how they interact.
194
  If the publishers in the market engage in lively 
 
184
 Kessler, supra note 179, at 632; W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic 
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment, 
Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (1976). 
185
 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828–29 (2006); Kennedy, supra note 180, at 616. 
186
 POSNER, supra note 165, at 116. 
187
 “Outside options” refers to the alternatives that a party has to coming to an agreement with another 
party. 
188
 See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of 
Two-Person Bargaining Games, 7 BEHAV. SCI. 67, 74 (1962); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 182, at 230.  
For a description of this problem in labor markets, see ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR MARKETS 5–6 (2003). 
189
 Monopsony theory corresponds to monopoly theory, but refers to concentrated market power on the 
side of the buyer. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER ET AL., PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS: DECISIONS, MARKETS, 
AND INFORMATION 364–65 (7th ed. 2005); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 65 
(1988) (Fr.); DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 551 (1990). 
190
 HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 473 (7th ed. 2006). 
191
 Deadweight loss—meaning that even if one were to somehow redistribute the wealth after the fact, 
the system would be producing less in general.  This matters to the distribution-oriented legislator insofar 
as there is less wealth to go around. 
192
 See MANNING, supra note 188.  A large number of workers with different job preferences are 
competing for labor contracts with a comparatively small number of possible employers. 
193
 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 182, at 373–74. 
194
 See VARIAN, supra note 190, at 480–502 (pertaining to oligopoly, but with the same effect).  
Monopsony power also depends on the elasticity of market supply.  Theoretically, in a market, the supply 
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price competition, their monopsony power and the negative effects on the amount offered 
for new use rights will be small.
195
  However, if they engage in quantity competition, are 
less competitive, or even collaborate with each other, then it is realistic to assume that 
authors will be left with fewer options and suffer price cuts.
196
 
¶56  As mentioned, in this regard, artistic markets can be compared to labor markets, to 
which oligopsonistic qualities are attributed.
197
  Furthermore, looking at publishing 
industries across the globe, the buyer market is often substantially concentrated.
198
  A 
number of studies using a variety of different methods have found that the concentration 
in most media industries has grown over the last century.
199
  This indicates that many 
sectors of the artistic and entertainment publishing industry are dominated by an 
increasingly small number of international conglomerates. 
¶57  For example, today’s music recording industry is commonly known to comprise 
four major labels (the “big four”):  Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, 
Warner Music Group, and EMI, which many assert to be oligopsonistic or even a 
“cartel.”
200
  While the latter claim is unconfirmed, studies do reflect the substantial 
market power of these conglomerates, finding that the industry is indeed controlled by a 
mere handful of firms.
201
  Many assert a similar situation for book publishers.  Studies 
find that the industry has become concentrated on an increasingly global scale over the 
last few decades, and a few large publishing corporations now own what used to be a 
 
of a good will increase when a higher price is offered, and vice versa.  Elasticity refers to how quickly the 
supply side can react to price changes. If the amount of supply can adapt very quickly, this can serve to 
undermine monopsony power. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 182, at 377–78.  Although the 
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artists for their rights, it is unlikely that price changes would be able to cause short-term reactions in the 
supply of works of authorship, which are not cranked out on an assembly line and require much personal 
input.  Since supply in this particular market is therefore highly inelastic, it cannot serve to weaken the 
monopsony power of publishers. 
195
 For the corresponding case of oligopoly, see MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 182, at 389 (noting that 
Bertrand competition is unrealistic in many settings); see also VARIAN, supra note 190, at 495. 
196
 See VARIAN, supra note 190, at 501. 
197
 See MANNING, supra note 188. 
198
 See, e.g., Ultra Concentrated Media: Selling Brands, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Apr. 2001, at 18, 
available at http://www.newint.org/features/2001/04/01/facts/; BERND-PETER LANGE, 
MEDIENWETTBEWERB, KONZENTRATION UND GESELLSCHAFT: INTERDISZIPLINÄRE ANALYSE VON 
MEDIENPLURALITÄT IN REGIONALER UND INTERNATIONALER PERSPEKTIVE [MEDIA COMPETITION, 
CONCENTRATION AND SOCIETY: INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF MEDIA PLURALISM WITH A REGIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE] 101–15 (2008) (Ger.); Pleister, supra note 132, at 673–74 (describing a 
stronger concentration in the United States than in Germany, but finding concentration tendencies in both 
countries); Michael Szenberg & Eric Youngkoo Lee, The Structure of the American Book Publishing 
Industry, 18 J. CULTURAL ECON. 313, 314 (1994); GRECO ET AL., supra note 166; see also Nordemann, 
supra note 178, at 1–2; Hugenholtz, supra note 133, at 9–10. 
199
 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF MEDIA STUDIES 296 (John D.H. Downing et al. eds., 2004). 
200




 Peter J. Alexander, Entropy and Popular Culture: Product Diversity in the Popular Music Recording 
Industry, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 171, 174 (1996) (comment on Richard A. Peterson & David G. Berger, Cycles 
in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music, 40 AM. SOC. REV. 158 (1975)) (noting “six large 
international firms account for nearly 98 percent of the output” of the music recording industry); Mike 
Jones, Market Research, in CONTINUUM ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR MUSIC OF THE WORLD: MEDIA, 
INDUSTRY AND SOCIETY 554, 555 (John Shepherd et al. eds., 2003) (“[R]ecord-making is dominated by five 
major, globally active firms . . . with the effect that certain techniques and practices . . . have come to be 
standardized among and between these companies.”). 
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large number of independent entities.
202
  Another prominent example is the film 
production industry, which since its inception has been oligopsonistic.
203
  Since the 
1920s, seven major production companies dominated the motion picture sector, 
provoking a large antitrust case in 1948.
204
  Although over time, this structure has 
somewhat altered and the number of independent film studios has increased, studies find 
that the “majors” continue to exert large economic power, thus maintaining the 
oligopsonistic qualities of the industry.
205
  Similar developments and structures are 
reported for sectors of the entertainment and news media industry, where publishers are 




¶58  A related parallel development is media convergence.  The borders between 
different publishing sectors are disappearing as traditional distribution methods become 
multimedia-based or digital, and firms begin to expand their areas of expertise to 
encompass more than one form of distribution.
207
  Many publishers no longer focus on 
just one type of work, such as news media, books, music, or films; rather, they are 
involved in publishing works of multiple, or even all, types.
208
  This development could 
cause the degree of power concentration in the publishing industry to be underestimated 




¶59  Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence of insufficient competition between 
publishers in practice.
210
  Even though some claim that these developments do not prove 
the prevalence of monopsony power in all creative markets,
211
 the concentration of the 
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203
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 Michael Storper & Susan Christopherson, Flexible Specialization and Regional Industrial 
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industry to fewer publishing entities can fully suffice to weaken the bargaining position 
of authors.  As mentioned above, the deadweight loss associated with market failure due 
to monopsony power is not primarily what the legislators are concerned with in this 
context.  The current examination is restricted to the question of whether the 
distributional outcome they claim is economically plausible.  As shown above, if there is 
indeed monopsony power, authors may suffer considerable losses due to both general 
market failure and their individual lack of distributive bargaining power.  However, even 
a weaker form of concentration or low-level competition among publishers, oligopsony 
or not, is likely to lead to authors receiving less of the distributable wealth.  As the 
number of buyers in a market decreases, an author’s outside options decrease relative to 
those of the publisher with whom he is bargaining. 
¶60  This Part, so far, confirms that the legislative fears of author bargaining 
disadvantages are, at the very least, plausible.  The next Part examines an additional 
factor that may contribute to market failure, in the worst case, and may cause bargaining 
disadvantages (and as a result, distributive effects) in any case:  the presence of 
asymmetric information. 
3. Incomplete and Asymmetric Information 
¶61  Another argument encountered in the legislative discussion is that authors are at a 
bargaining disadvantage due to the difficulty of determining the future value of their 
work.
212
  Economic theory assumes that uncertainty of future values is factored into the 
negotiation as probabilities.  So long as both parties know the expected value,
213
 there is 
no reason to assume that one of them is at a bargaining disadvantage simply because the 
true monetary worth is unknown at the time of the contract.  However, if there is reason 
to believe that one party has more accurate information about the expected value than the 
other, problems may arise. 
¶62  In many markets, the seller often has better information about the true worth of the 
good than the buyer.
214
  In the case of exclusive rights, it is likely to be the other way 
around.  Publishing firms, which employ teams of experts and have years of experience 
and know-how in distributing and marketing artistic works, will generally have far better 
knowledge of the probabilities that a certain work will be successful enough to achieve 
distribution over future media, and of the expected revenues.  Indeed, it has been argued 
that one of the reasons that publishing firms exist is that they offer the asset of superior 
knowledge of the industry and thus can function as gatekeepers.
215
  The author selling the 
rights, on the other hand, is generally (and plausibly) believed to be less experienced in 
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(Ger.). 
215
 CAVES, supra note 175, at 52–56. 




  Because authors are aware that publishers have better 
information and that they suffer disadvantages due to this asymmetry, a theoretical 
question is why they do not simply acquire the missing information.  That they tend to 
remain “ignorant” is not necessarily attributed to irrational behavior such as laziness or 
lack of mathematical ability, but can be sufficiently explained by the fact that the costs of 
acquiring the necessary information are too high.
217
  It would be impossibly difficult for 
most authors to gather enough experience and knowledge to successfully compete with a 
publishing firm.  Essentially, the author is burdened with much greater costs of missing 
information than the publisher. 
¶63  Given that authors are generally uninformed regarding the true value of their rights, 
the prices that authors are willing to sell for are not optimal.
218
  This could mean that a 
number of authors may be selling their rights for too little, but also, theoretically, that 
some may be overestimating the expected value of their work.
219
  However, since 
publishers are better informed, they will have a lower reservation price, leaving authors 
who value their rights too highly with the choice of selling for less, or not having their 
work distributed at all.
220
  Additionally, authors having fewer outside options and being 
subject to financial constraints can serve to further drive down the price, even for those 
authors who value their rights highly.  Those who underestimate the value of their 
exclusive rights because of the information asymmetry will suffer a loss in any case. 
¶64  This Part has assumed that author and publisher are operating with different 
expected values.  But even if this were not the case, and both parties were fully informed 
as to the true probabilities on which the expected future value is based, the balance in 
bargaining power between authors and publishers would be impacted by another concern: 
how the parties manage uncertainty and risk.  The next Part examines this factor. 
4. Uncertainty and Risk Aversion 
¶65  When initially entering into the contract, the author is faced with a choice:  sell the 
rights to the unknown uses of a work, for which a certain amount of money will be paid 
immediately, or hold out in anticipation of a potential future distribution method with the 
hopes of selling for a higher price in the future.  In this situation, opting to withhold the 
rights and turning down the offer of immediate payment involves considerable 
uncertainty around three aspects of the transaction in particular.  First, there is uncertainty 
regarding the long-term commercial value of the work itself, because generally, the 
market success of creative works is extremely difficult to predict.
221
  Then, there is 
uncertainty regarding the invention and marketability of new methods with which the 
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work could be distributed, and the point in time this would occur.
222
  Furthermore, there 
is uncertainty regarding the potential profits to be made with the new distribution 
methods. 
¶66  The parties calculate the expected future value of the rights by using the 
probabilities of these outcomes.
223
  In theory, the expected value is simply the weighted 
average value of all possible payoffs.  When comparing actual value (the price offered ex 
ante) for new use rights with expected value (the future price expected, adjusted for the 
risk that the amount will be less or nothing) when the values are equal, there is no 
immediately apparent reason to prefer one over the other.  A risk-neutral person will in 
fact be indifferent when choosing between a certain payoff and an uncertain payoff of 
equal expected value.  A risk-averse person, however, will not be.  In particular, a risk-
averse person will prefer an option in which they are certain to receive the amount 
offered over an option in which it is highly uncertain whether they will receive the 
amount offered, even if the expected value of the latter is larger.
224
 
¶67  Of course, in the case of new use right contracts, both parties face the same 
probabilities.
225
  The expected values and variabilities are no different for the publisher, 
because the firm bears the exact same risks when making the decision whether to 
purchase either now or later.  However, discrepancies in choice may emerge when 
authors and publishers hold differing attitudes towards risk. 
¶68  Individuals are generally assumed to be risk-averse when it comes to their basic 
income.
226
  Firms, on the other hand, are assumed to be risk-neutral.
227
  There are two 
reasons for this assumption.  First, firms are able to reduce risk through diversification.  
This means that they disperse risk by engaging in a large number of different projects, the 
successes and failures of which are independent from one another.  Even though the 
individual projects may be highly risky, they will balance themselves out in the 
aggregate.
228
  Because firms are able to diversify on a much larger scale than most 
individuals, they are comparatively less exposed to concentration risk.  Second, firms are 
believed to be more risk-neutral regarding individual transactions because of the 
difference in available capital.  As discussed above,
229
 individuals are subject to more 
limiting budget constraints than firms.  Since absolute risk aversion is negatively 
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 this creates a difference in risk attitudes between the author and 
publisher because the publishing firm has more capital at its disposal.  The author’s 
preference for certain income over uncertain income would lead to ex ante transfers of 
new use rights for prices that are lower than the expected future value.
231
  The 
distributional implications would confirm the legislative intuition that publishers garner a 
comparatively higher share of the wealth generated by copyrighted works. 
5. Implications 
¶69  If authors are comparatively subject to budget constraints, fewer outside options, 
and incomplete information, publishers will likely reap a larger part of the bargaining 
surplus in contract negotiations.  Furthermore, risk aversion may motivate authors to sell 
their rights for less than if they were to take the full expected value into account.  The 
combined effect would be a wealth distribution that is more favorable to publishers.  
Therefore, the legislative assumption regarding the distributional outcome in absence of 
intervention appears likely from an economic perspective.  Next, this Article analyzes the 
effects of the legislative solution. 
B. Grant Restrictions and Transaction Costs 
¶70  Because of the above-discussed legislatively undesired distributional outcome, 
restricting the grant of exclusive rights to unknown uses aims to reallocate wealth to 
authors.  Indeed, inalienably vesting the rights to unforeseen distribution methods in the 
author until such methods become known seems likely to reduce uncertainty and provide 
further opportunity for creators to bargain over the financial benefits derived from their 
work.
232
  Accordingly, the legislative decision to restrict the granting of rights for new 
uses appears to strengthen the author’s financial position.  However, this Part examines 
the effects of the restriction from a market-cost viewpoint to determine whether the 
legislative goal is likely to be achieved through these means. 
¶71  One of the economic differences between a legal system that allows or prohibits the 
grant of new use rights is that the latter inevitably leads to contract renegotiation.  When 
an unforeseen use arises, the distribution of the work over the new medium is contingent 
on a new license agreement between the publisher and the copyright owner.  The 
compulsory contract negotiation raises a variety of theoretical issues.  This Part focuses 
on important issues that are practically relevant—namely, the costs incurred by additional 
contracting at a later stage. 
¶72  Generally, high transaction costs will lead not only to higher expenses for 
individual contracting parties, but can also result in costs to society by making socially 
desirable market exchange more difficult.  For this reason, much of traditional and 
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contemporary law and economics research aims to increase social welfare by structuring 
legal rules so that endogenous and unnecessary transaction costs are minimized.
233
  
However, the analysis in this Article focuses on the positive question of whether the legal 
rule imposed by the legislature is likely to bring about an improvement in authors’ 
financial situations by redistributing the bargaining surplus.  Social costs are therefore 
only considered to the extent that a general reduction of wealth may decrease the wealth 
available for distribution to authors.  Below, this Article describes the transaction costs 
that are likely to arise in new use contracting situations, as well as their implications for 
the distributional outcome. 
1. Search and Information Costs 
¶73  Under a system that prohibits the ex ante grant of rights, the parties are required to 
renegotiate a new license agreement when a new use of the copyrighted work arises.  
This means that the publisher who wishes to distribute a licensed copyrighted work over 
a new medium must first identify and locate the current right holder.  The phrase “current 
right holder” extends beyond the original author; copyrights are transferable and 
inevitably change hands.
234
  Because there is no mandatory registry for copyright 
ownership,
235
 locating and contacting the responsible party years or decades after the 
initial grant of rights may require considerable effort. 
2. Bargaining Costs 
¶74  The publisher’s next cost-incurring step is to renegotiate a license agreement or, at 
the very least, to obtain clearance from the right holder.
236
  There is also a risk that the 
right holder will be unwilling to enter into an agreement. This risk raises uncertainty and 
decreases the expected return from bargaining. 
3. Enforcement Costs 
¶75  Under a restrictive system, there is likely to be uncertainty regarding the 
enforcement of the original copyright agreement, because the legal definition of new use 
has proven extremely difficult to establish.
237
  Because each media development can give 
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rise to a legal battle over whether the use is considered new in a legal sense, the 
probability that an initial grant of rights may lead to costly litigation in the future is likely 
to generate enforcement costs.
238
 
¶76  Another uncertainty relates to the scope of the first license.  Assuming the two uses 
are substitutable, meaning the old use may be replaced by the new use, the old agreement 
may produce more restricted rights and returns than initially assumed.  Instead of being 
able to secure an all-encompassing copyright, independent of media form, the publisher 
must factor in the risk that the market segment for the granted use is appropriated by a 
new media development at some uncertain time in the future.  While this uncertainty 
would lower the amount the publisher is willing to pay, it would theoretically lower the 
author’s price limit as well, because the smaller expected value of the grant will raise 
willingness to sell. 
¶77  The uncertainty with regard to litigation costs, on the other hand, has an effect on 
the parties’ joint bargaining space.  In negotiating the initial agreement, the expected cost 
of enforcement may drive down the publisher’s reservation price (the maximum price the 
publisher is willing to pay).  At the same time, the author’s reservation price (the 
minimum price the author is willing to accept) would be influenced in the opposite 
direction.  This leaves less bargaining room and may preclude ex ante agreements.  The 
risk of a costly legal battle over who owns the right to which use will not occur where 
new use rights are clearly granted before the occurrence.
239
 
4. Tragedy of the Anticommons 
¶78  The transaction costs described above are all magnified by what is commonly 
called the tragedy of the anticommons.
240
  This concept pertains to a market inefficiency 
that arises when (property) rights to complementary assets are fragmented and there are 
too many different owners.  Excessive fragmentation of ownership in a market leads to 
higher transaction costs, including coordination difficulties and the danger of individuals 
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preventing joint transactions.  In the publishing practice, many new media distribution 
methods will involve the clearance of more than just one right.  For instance, making a 
periodical journal available in an online database will include many articles written by 
different authors.  Without the possibility of securing all rights at the time of the initial 
publication, a publisher who wishes to make use of such a database later on will be 
required to seek and clear the new use rights for every single copyrighted work involved. 
¶79  The situation becomes even more intricate when dealing with assembled works.  
Much of modern creativity draws from or collects together a variety of sources, all of 
which are separately copyrightable.
241
  A good example is the documentary film.  A 
standard documentary film comprises hundreds of clips of video footage, music, art, and 
photos, all belonging to different right holders.  Securing these licenses even to simply 
produce the film is already quite costly.  Securing them again, years or decades later, to 
distribute the film in a new media form has proven to be nearly impossible in practice.
242
  
To illustrate, the copyright to the material in the Martin Luther King documentary Eyes 
on the Prize, directed by Henry Hampton,
243
 initially only included television 
broadcasting.  Despite its cultural and historical importance, re-releasing the film in DVD 
format necessitated a considerable and incredibly costly joint effort.  The right-clearance 
took twenty years, a $600,000 donation from the Ford Foundation, hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in contributions from others, and considerable volunteer efforts.
244
  
Additionally, with joint works, any one of the right holders whose contribution is 





¶80  As seen above, there are many potential kinds of costs involved in renegotiating 
new use licenses.  Furthermore, it is plausible that the magnitude thereof can be 
prohibitive.  If the sum of all transaction costs exceeds the expected value of an 
agreement, these costs will hinder otherwise desirable licensing relationships.  Publishers 
will either offset the costs with a reduction in what they are willing to pay, or they may 
reduce their investment in more “risky” relationships (such as promoting works with 
uncertain success), leading to a reduction in the number of authors who can benefit from 
a copyright agreement.  Assuming that the legislative goal is, as noted above, distribution 
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of wealth to authors, the generation of high transaction costs would undermine the 
legislative intent. 
¶81  In theory, these costs are not restricted to prohibitive regimes.  Countries that allow 
the parties full freedom of contract where new use right grants are involved will 
theoretically also enable authors to refuse the ex ante transfer of their rights.  
Furthermore, in practice, there are always cases in which the contracting parties simply 
did not anticipate the possibility of future financial benefit or think to minimize future 
costs by stipulating the transfer of such rights at the time of contract.  However, licensing 
contracts are increasingly including long-sighted provisions as the publishing industry 
learns from its mistakes.
246
  The broad scope of rights transfer clauses in agreements in 
practice backs the assumption that publishers have a strong interest in securing the rights 
to future uses ex ante.  As discussed above, there are various reasons why authors may 
share this interest,
247




¶82  This implies that a regime that allows freedom of contract will essentially lead to a 
system in which most new use rights are assigned ex ante.  Although contract 
renegotiation may continue to occur in certain cases, overall costs are likely considerably 
reduced by allowing publishers to secure new use rights before the event.  A restrictive 
legal regime, on the other hand, will presumably incur far more of the above-described 
transaction costs.  In light of this outcome, legislatures that are concerned about the 
distribution of wealth to authors may need to question whether the chosen solution is 
likely to reach its goal. 
¶83  Although this analysis is theoretical and further empirical research may be required 
to strengthen its conclusions, it is also supported by anecdotal evidence.  The following 
relates the story of the reform in Germany and how a growing awareness of distribution 
problems due to the above-described transaction costs was the driving force behind the 
change. 
6. Anecdotal Evidence (German Reform) 
¶84  In German copyright law, there has been an interesting turn of events in the area of 
new use right grants.  Germany introduced new copyright legislation in January 2008.
249
  
One of the most significant changes was the abolishment of § 31(4), which had 
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prohibited the granting of copyrights for unknown uses.  This Part describes the 
developments that led to the revision. 
¶85  As mentioned previously, an analysis of the case law prior to the reform in 
Germany shows a gradual tendency toward a less restrictive application of the general 
prohibition.
250
  Courts were increasingly hesitant to declare media developments to be 
unforeseen or new uses under the law.
251
  In 1995, the German Federal Court of Justice 
decided (in contrast to its earlier practice) that “risk agreements” covering known 
technology of yet unknown economic importance were permitted, even in standard form 
contracts.
252
  This was followed by Klimbim in 1997, a controversial case in which the 
court held that a contract granting the rights to all known television distribution methods, 
including those not generally applied, covered direct satellite and cable broadcast 
rights.
253
  Although these methods arguably constituted additional sources of profit for 
the publisher,
254
 the court did not see them as new uses.  In 2005, the German Federal 
Court of Justice also prominently declared that DVD distribution was not a sufficiently 
new form of distribution media under a contract granting videocassette rights.
255
 
¶86  Although criticized in the literature from all sides for its chosen methods,256 the 
court’s reasoning reflects growing sensitivity to the economic problems arising from the 
legal situation in practice.
257
  Allowing “risk agreements” was intended to reduce the 
legal uncertainty (and thereby enforcement costs) that publishers face when investing in 
new media.
258
  In Klimbim, the court stated that, while § 31(4) aims to prevent the profits 
from new distribution methods from being withheld from the author, the prohibition of 
new use right transfers should not hinder economic and technological improvement.  
New, independently licensable distribution methods must not be impeded by the strict 




¶87  Following this line of cases, an increasing number of voices began to call for a 
reform of the law.
260
  In 1995, the German Parliament appointed a committee to analyze 
the influence of technological development and new media on copyright law in 
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  They also stressed the issue of § 31(4), calling attention to substantial 
practical difficulties that had arisen due to the prohibition of new use right grants.
262
 
¶88  According to the committee, the problem had become virulent with the 
development of digital media and the possibility of making compilations such as 
periodical journals available on CD-ROM.  Because of the sheer cost and impracticality 
of the task, many publishers were not attempting to seek new use rights for every single 
work involved and were instead publishing the compilations without the authors’ 
consent.
263
  In an attempt to stay within the confines of the law, art book publishers have 
gone so far as to have all original photos retaken for new publications, because this 
reportedly cost less than having to renegotiate with the copyright owners.
264
  The 
committee noted that it would have been impractical for the publishers to have followed 
the path foreseen by the legal requirement.  They would have had to acquire permission 
from every single rights-holder, some of whom were deceased or untraceable.  
Additionally, any one of the authors could have prevented the entire publication of the 
work by refusing to give permission.
265
  For this reason, the committee recommended 
abolishing the prohibition of granting the rights to unknown uses in § 31(4).
266
 
¶89  In a 2006 draft law that aimed to implement this recommendation, the 
accompanying explanatory statement also emphasized the problem of prohibitively high 
search and information costs involved in locating rights-holders.
267
  The problem of 
having to acquire rights from multiple parties as a result of the prohibition in § 31(4) was 
also one of the central arguments of the discussion.
268
  The immense organizational effort 
required to obtain clearance from multiple rights-holders was argued to be more than just 
a financial burden for publishers: it was recognized as leading to the exclusion and non-
publication of commercially less successful works, because law-abiding publishers were 
shying away from the costs of distributing them over new methods.
269
  Thus, the purpose 
of § 31(4) was reversed:  instead of securing authors a share in the financial profits of 






 The committee was not limited to these functions.  An inquiry committee established by enactment of 
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Dec. 5, 1995, BT 13/3219 (Ger.). 
262
 Zweiter Zwischenbericht der Enquete-Kommission [Second Interim Report of the Inquiry 
Committee], June 30, 1997, BT 13/8110 (Ger.), available at 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/13/081/1308110.pdf. 
263
 Id. at 38.  
264
 Id. at 39. 
265
 Id. at 39. 
266
 However, the committee also recognized the legislature’s intended distributional goal of protecting 
the author’s financial interests.  Therefore, it suggested amending the law to allow the grant of unknown 
use rights, so long as the author is guaranteed reasonable participation in the proceeds. See id. at 40. 
267
 Gesetzesentwurf, June 15, 2006, BT 16/1828, at 22 (Ger.). 
268
 Id.; Schulze, supra note 62, at 547. 
269
 See, for example, the argumentation of a legal committee on the impracticability of applying § 31(4) 
to performing artists due to the obvious difficulties of renegotiating new use rights with a large number of 
work participants. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses, Jan. 23, 2002, BT 14/8058, at 
21 (Ger.). 
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 See Nordemann, supra note 64, at 198. 
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¶90  Another argument that various interest groups presented prior to the reform was the 
legal uncertainty regarding the scope of copyright agreements and the risk of costly 
litigation procedures.
271
  Depending on the technology in question, there was 
considerable difficulty determining what constituted a new distribution method and 
whether or not it was “unforeseen.”
272
  Take the case of the DVD, for example.  German 
legal opinions differed considerably on the question of whether it constituted a new 
distribution method as compared to the previous VHS technology.
273
  As discussed, it 
was not until 2005 that the DVD was declared not a sufficiently different distribution 
method to qualify as new.
274
  The German Federal Court of Justice’s decision was 
preceded by over twenty years of legal uncertainty regarding DVD distribution rights.
275
  
Due to the lack of sufficient measures for defining unforeseen and new uses, practically 
every new medium had inevitably become a source of legal uncertainty.
276
  Because 
courts were unable to standardize the issue, every new technological development led to 
an increase in litigation.
277
  Thus, in a world in which technological innovation occurs 
more and more rapidly, having each new medium become the subject of court 
proceedings lasting fifteen years or longer
278
 made it increasingly clear that § 31(4) was 
creating an inefficient legal framework.  This uncertainty was criticized as an additional 
high cost, often having prohibitive effects. 
¶91  Interestingly, the German media industries were not alone in pushing for change.  
Naturally, the media lobby was very much in favor of abolishing § 31(4), its main interest 
being a reduction in publishing expenses.
279
  The ability to secure the rights to new uses 
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However, there were also many voices arguing for reform for reasons other than 
publishers’ interests.  A number of German legal scholars strongly advocated reforming 
the law, not on behalf of the media industry, but instead in the interest of author 
protection.
281
  Many recognized that the economic hindrances that publishers faced could 
have negative effects on authors.  Where costs are prohibitively high, authors could miss 
out on follow-up contracts altogether.
282
  As seen above, fewer contracts and lower 
reservation prices of contracting partners are not advantageous to authors, who usually 
have an interest in widespread dissemination of their work and are financially dependent 
on granting their copyrights to publishers.
283
  As in the example of CD-ROM distribution, 
publishers facing high costs were either illegally evading new licensing contracts or 
finding alternatives to contracting with the original right holders.
284
  Experts realized that 
instead of giving the author more control, as originally intended by the legislature, 
§ 31(4) was taking it away.
285
 
¶92  Advocates for change also argued that new media development may be slowed 
down by the restrictive system.
286
  This concern was initially expressed in the case law 
prior to the reform
287
 and was also included in the official reasoning for the draft law and 
the aforementioned commission report.
288
  By making distribution through new use 
methods difficult and costly, many viewed the prohibition in § 31(4) as an impediment to 
new technologies entering the market.
289
  Considering the author’s strong interest in 




¶93  The legislature and many of the discussion participants recognized, however, that 
simply getting rid of the prohibition would also thwart the original distributional aim of 
the legal intervention.  There were concerns that the author’s financial interests, the 
protection of which remains a fundamental purpose of German copyright law, would be 
 
above), reducing legal uncertainty would nevertheless lie more in the power of the parties. 
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endangered if legal intervention in copyright agreements were to be completely 
withdrawn.  In reforming the law, the German legislature was confronted with the task of 
protecting this distribution preference, but also mitigating the previously unrecognized 
negative effects on the market.
291
 
¶94  The much-debated and finally implemented solution came in the form of a 
revocation right.
292
  As of the copyright law reform in 2008, the grant of unknown-use 
rights is possible in Germany, but authors can revoke the grant within three months of a 
new distribution method.  According to the newly introduced statute, § 31a, the author is 
explicitly allowed to grant the rights to unknown uses, provided the grant is made in 
written form.
293
  Section 31a(1) establishes an inalienable revocation right, allowing the 
author to back out of the copyright contract within three months of being notified of the 
new use, no matter what was originally stipulated in the contract.
294
 
¶95  This solution allows those authors who were at an informational or economic 
disadvantage when entering the contract to correct the situation ex post and increases the 
general bargaining leverage of authors.
295
  But because the revocation right is limited to 
the original author,
296
 and the publisher’s notification duty is fulfilled with notice to the 
last known address,
297
 the new system should have the effect of considerably reducing 
transaction costs in comparison to the previous, more restrictive regime.  Limitation of 
the revocation right to the original author means that there is no need to track down 
copyrights that have repeatedly changed hands.  In particular, the many cases in which an 
author is deceased or untraceable are no longer a hindrance.  Furthermore, for all authors 
who do not explicitly object to the new distribution method, there is no need to draw up 
or negotiate a new contract.  In addition, § 31a(3) holds that for conglomerate works with 
multiple authors, no individual may make use of the revocation right in “bad faith.”
298
  
This serves to prevent dire cases of blocking within the tragedy of the anticommons 
problem.
299
  Coming back to the example of the newspaper publisher in Part I, this solves 
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Vol. 10:7] Kate Darling 
 525 
¶96  It must be said that a system granting the author a revocation right is still likely to 
incur more transaction costs than a non-paternalistic system that freely allows the grant.  
First, there will still be some search and information costs involved in fulfilling the 
notification duty.  Second, the threat of revocation may be used by the author to induce a 
negotiation over a new contract,
300
 which will raise bargaining costs.  Furthermore, this 
threat introduces legal uncertainty regarding the initial grant of the rights from the 
beginning of the contractual relationship until three months after the new distribution 
method has been introduced.
301
  Finally, there is still the risk of enforcement costs due to 
the remaining uncertainty regarding the definition of a new use.
302
  However, the chosen 
solution is still suitable for eliminating a considerable amount of “unnecessary” 
transaction costs. 
¶97  To sum up, one of the main factors that appears to have led to the reform in 
Germany was the realization that the restrictive law had caused high transaction costs, 
leading to a distributional outcome that was different—even contrary—to what had been 
originally intended by the regulation.  While the chosen solution is debatable on many 
levels, the intent of the new legislation is clear:  to conserve the original distributional 
aim of the legal intervention in new use right contracts, while structuring the law to 
account for economic costs that had previously been insufficiently considered.  The 
developments leading to this reform nicely demonstrate the importance of looking more 
closely at the distributive arguments behind restricting grants of new use rights, and 
considering their potential market effects in practice. 
C. Further Considerations 
¶98  Requiring contract renegotiation between publisher and author in cases of 
unforeseen uses may have more effects on the market than merely that of high transaction 
costs.  This Part considers other potential influences on the distributional outcome.  
Although perhaps not as directly observable or evident as the above-described issue of 
transaction costs, economic theory provides further insights into what could prove useful 
to investigate in subsequent research.  For example, empirical studies could look at the 
likelihood and practical impact of “hold up” effects. 
1. Hold Up in Incomplete Contracts 
¶99  The classic theory of hold up in incomplete contracts can be outlined as follows.  A 
contract is regarded as incomplete when it does not stipulate what is to happen in every 
possible future scenario.  In the case that an event with unspecified consequences occurs, 
the parties must renegotiate the contractual relationship.  The trouble arises when one 
party has made a relationship-specific investment prior to the renegotiation
303
 and is 
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thereby dependent on the continuance of the contractual relationship to recoup her 
investment.  The other party could threaten to withhold cooperation ex post and 
expropriate the bargaining surplus, essentially holding up the party that has invested.  The 
investing party will likely try to avoid being held up or at least attempt to minimize the 
loss in profit, which results in investments that are not socially optimal.  This is the 
classic hold up problem.
304
 
¶100  The most obvious solution to this predicament is to induce the parties to create a 
written contract in advance that fixes the terms with regard to the future event.  However, 
this may not be possible if the relevant circumstances of the event are unknown prior to 
its occurrence.  Property rights theory provides the following classic solution to the hold 
up problem: assignment of a property right to the party more likely to make relationship-
specific investments, the underinvestment in which would be socially undesirable.
305
  The 
owner can thus determine the consequences when the event occurs and enjoy the right to 
all unanticipated proceeds.  Within this framework, it is socially desirable to give the 
investing party all of the ex post bargaining power, as this will prevent him from falling 
prey to the hold up situation and thereby enable a socially optimal level of investment. 
¶101  This theory can be applied to new use copyright licenses.  A copyright contract can 
be incomplete in that it does not specify what happens to the contractual relationship in 
the case that a future, unforeseen use of a copyrighted work arises.
306
  Assuming the 
absence of a legal rule to fill the gap, if the contract says nothing about which party owns 
the rights to unstipulated distribution forms, the parties have no choice but to renegotiate 
their agreement when new media are developed.  With regard to the distribution of 
copyrighted works, the party that makes relationship-specific investments is likely to be 
the publisher, who invests in new distribution methods or media technology. 
¶102  Consider, for example, the newspaper publisher who buys into CD-ROM 
technology to make previous, archived issues available by month or year.  She will likely 
incur costs to look into the technical possibilities, assess the marketability, bargain with 
suppliers, or even develop and customize the new technology herself.  Because of the 
initial uncertainty regarding the feasibility and value of the new method, this will 
generally happen before the publisher can begin the rights-clearing process.  Therefore, 
by the time of the contract renegotiation, the publisher has (at least some) sunken 
investment costs.  Assuming that the archived issues are to be made available in their 
entirety,
307
 the cooperation of all involved right holders is needed.  Now that the 
publisher is dependent on all of the follow-up contracts in order to distribute the new 
media and regain the sunken investment, each of the involved journalists (or the 
successors who own the copyrights) can hold up the publisher by threatening to withhold 
 
defines relationship-specific investment as “an investment that increases the productivity of the relationship 
under study, has a lower value outside of this relationship, [or] is costly for the party that makes it.” See 
BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER 196 (MIT Press 1997) (1994) (Fr.). 
304
 See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 303, at 490–91. 
305
 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); see also Oliver Hart & John Moore, 
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988). 
306
 This could be because the parties did not anticipate a new use at all or because they were unable to 
evaluate the future situation and chose to leave the consequences unspecified. 
307
 This assumption is valid either because it would be difficult and costly to leave out individual 
contributions, or because the market value is contingent on complete volumes (e.g., because the targeted 
consumers have a strong preference for unperforated issues). 
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their rights.  Because the publisher will anticipate this situation, she will try to avoid 
being held up or at least attempt to minimize losses, leading to less ex ante investment in 
CD-ROM technology. 
¶103  In the situation at hand, the copyrights to future uses of copyrighted works can be 
viewed as the property right in the classic solution to the hold up problem.  The 
legislature can therefore influence the hold up potential of incomplete contract situations 
by making the ex ante decision to grant the copyright to either the author or the publisher.  
By legally prohibiting the grant of new use rights, the legislature very firmly assigns this 
right to the author.
308
  However, as seen above, the decision as to which party receives 
the property right should be conditioned on which side’s underinvestment would be more 
detrimental.  If it is indeed the case that publishers tend to be more in danger of making 
relationship-specific investments, then allocating the copyright to the author will 
aggravate, not solve, the hold up problem. 
¶104  However, the applicability of this framework may be subject to limitations.  First, 
the efficient allocation of the right depends on which party is more likely to make 
desirable investments that could be subject to a hold up situation.  Given the current 
structure of most publishing industries, it is intuitively plausible that publishers run more 
risk of sunk investments before a contract renegotiation can be initiated.  However, it is 
theoretically possible that the underinvesting party could be the artist.  For example, the 
assignment of all rights to a publisher could undermine the incentives of authors to invest 
in the value of their work through, for example, self-promotion.
309
 
¶105  Furthermore, the theory may be limited in that it is too static.  In the case of new 
use right grants, the hold up situation outlined above assumes that the copyrighted work 
already exists.  A more dynamic view would consider sequential investments.
310
  
Although authors are less prone to underinvestment in distribution, their incentives may 
nevertheless be influenced by the assignment of copyrights to publishers, leading to 
underinvestment in the creation of works and, perhaps, less authorship altogether.
311
  A 
legislature that intends to protect authors’ financial interests will likely not desire a 
decrease in general authorship and, thus, other means of incentivizing creation would be 
necessary.  Depending on the costs of such intervention, they could outweigh the benefits 
of preventing hold up, the impact of which is theoretical and may not be of great 
importance in practice.  For example, the amount of actual publisher investments that are 





 It is even true without leaving the parties (who may be better informed than the state) the opportunity 
to bargain and allocate it differently ex ante. 
309
 Currently, given the somewhat limited author investment possibilities in practice, this moral hazard is 
likely to be outweighed by the risk of the publisher’s underinvestment in new media technology.  However, 
it should be kept in mind that most creative industries are currently undergoing or standing on the brink of 
considerable changes.  It is not completely unthinkable that the underinvestment may in some future cases 
lie with the author. 
310
 See, e.g., Yeon-Koo Che & József Sákovics, A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1063 
(2004); see also Georg Nöldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, Sequential Investments and Options to Own, 29 
RAND J. ECON. 633 (1998). 
311
 A counterargument to this dynamic effect on investment incentives could be that allocating 
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allowing more publisher investment may make less of a difference for authors than immediately assumed. 
312
 As mentioned above, the situation could be that a publisher invests in a new technology covering 
inseparable works with multiple owners, or in author-specific marketability.  However, it is indeed difficult 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 2  
 
 528
¶106  Finally, assuming that the above-discussed financial and informational asymmetries 
between firms and individuals put authors at a bargaining disadvantage, this may mitigate 




¶107  Given the assumption that publishers are more likely to make socially desirable 
investments that could be endangered by hold up situations, classical hold up theory 
implies that initially granting the author the right to all distribution methods is inefficient, 
as renegotiation in cases of incomplete contracts will incur the problem of publisher 
underinvestment.  As one can imagine, the overall effect of many publishers 
underinvesting could be to slow or hinder the socially desirable development and 
distribution of new media technologies.  The societal disadvantage of such 
underinvestment is clear, but even disregarding social welfare and focusing solely on 
authors’ interests, less investment in distribution and distribution methods is hardly to the 
advantage of artistic creators.  Therefore, at least within this theoretical framework, it 
would be undesirable even for a purely distribution-oriented legislature to forbid the ex 
ante grant of new use rights (or even allocate these rights to authors in the first place).
314
  
Under a non-restrictive system, the parties are more able (and likely) to draft complete 
contracts ex ante, considerably reducing the overall problem. 
¶108  However, considering the limitations of this very theoretical framework, further 
research would be necessary to derive concrete implications.  Although this Part suggests 
that the attempt to find out whether hold up problems apply to new use right practice may 
be useful, the question of how to conduct such research is not easy.  Hold up-related 
underinvestment may be difficult, if not impossible, to measure in this area.  Cross-border 
comparisons are likely to be too complicated because of the multitude of other factors 
that may account for differences, such as market structures and the work made for hire 
doctrine.
315
  However, one method could be to conduct qualitative studies, such as 
interviews with publishers, in an attempt to determine whether hold up expectations 
discourage investments in practice. 
D. Summary 
¶109  From an economic perspective, the legislative picture of the financially 
disadvantaged author is plausible.  Taking into account that authors in practice are 
generally individuals, while publishers are often firms,
316
 it is likely that authors are 
subject to more budget constraints, fewer outside options, less complete information, and 
increased risk aversion.  When bargaining over contracts with new use right clauses, this 
may allow their contracting partners to reap a larger share of the joint surplus, leading to 
 
to find good examples for relationship-specific investments in new media that would need to occur prior to 
a potential renegotiation. 
313
 See supra Part IV.A. 
314
 This assumes that there is a less costly way to achieve the desired wealth distribution.  Given the 
abundance of different possibilities, this is likely.  However, exploring such alternatives remains beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
315
 See supra note 95. 
316
 This distinction does not necessarily apply in the U.S. legal system, which employs the “work made 
for hire” doctrine, but is likely to hold true for the other jurisdictions. 
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a distributional outcome that is more favorable to publishers.  For legislatures that deem 
this situation undesirable and prefer to allocate more wealth to authors, restricting the 
grant of new use rights intuitively appears to reduce uncertainty and give authors more 
bargaining leverage. 
¶110  However, requiring contract renegotiation when new distribution methods arise can 
generate a variety of costs.  According to the economic theory and anecdotal evidence 
discussed in this Part, a legal regime that restricts the ex ante grant of new use rights will 
lead to high transaction costs, causing a reduction in the amount of trade that takes place 
or the prices that publishers are willing to pay for exclusive rights and potentially 
impeding the distribution of copyrighted works, as well as the investment in new media 
technology.  Restricting the grant of rights to unknown uses could also potentially lead to 
underinvestment arising from hold up situations.  All in all, authors may be unable to 
reap the financial benefits assumed by the legislature, and the distributional goal could in 
effect be thwarted entirely. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶111  Comparative legal analysis reveals that the treatment of new use right grants varies 
across borders.  United States copyright law, while recognizing author termination rights, 
generally allows the parties freedom of contract in assigning the rights to new distribution 
methods.  Other countries have chosen to restrict such assignments.  Many European 
countries set high barriers to granting the rights or simply prohibit unknown uses of 
copyrighted works.  The reasoning for this measure is regularly distributive.  Creators are 
believed to be morally entitled to the financial benefits of their works.  Because authors 
are assumed to be at a bargaining disadvantage when entering into copyright agreements 
with publishers, there is a fear that they will not be able to reap enough of the 
distributable profits arising from the use of their creations.  Legal intervention is thus 
deemed necessary to protect their financial interests and achieve redistribution of wealth. 
¶112  This Article finds that the legislative assumption that wealth distribution will be 
more favorable to publishers in a system without intervention is economically plausible.  
However, it also finds that restricting new use right grants may entail economic costs that 
thwart the intended goal of redistributing wealth to authors.  In light of this result, 
preventing the grant of unknown-use rights may not be a suitable instrument for 
legislation to protect authors’ financial interests.
317
  These insights can be of value to the 
ongoing legislative discussion over author-protective copyright laws, particularly in 
countries that are rethinking the approach to new use right grants. 
¶113  That said, this Article does not attempt to normatively determine the optimal design 
of new use right laws for two reasons.  First, factors specific to individual countries 
influence copyright legislation in the real world, which makes a one-size-fits-all solution 
unfeasible.  Empirical research may be helpful in recognizing these factors and designing 
national laws that reach the desired outcome within their respective borders.  This Article 
helps to determine relevant directions for such research on a local scale.  Second, an 
approach that disregards the “fairness” argumentation of legislatures and focuses solely 
on economically efficient mechanism design may be interesting in theory, but it 
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 Whether or not this should be the ultimate goal of copyright law remains outside the scope of the 
analysis. 
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completely ignores the reality of legislative discourse.  Although the chosen approach 
may be frustrating to some economists, one of the major contributions that lawyers can 
make in the field of law and economics is not detailed knowledge of legal statutes, but 
rather an understanding of legal discourse and lawmaking in practice.  This allows 
lawyers to identify relevant issues and make well-founded arguments for changes that can 
be implemented realistically, given the structure of today’s political world.
318
  For this 
reason, this Article looks closely at the legal arguments surrounding these laws and raises 
issues that are tangible enough to find their way into the legislative discussion and get the 
consideration they deserve. 
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 This is not to say that optimal mechanism design is not both valuable and importantonly that 
building bridges is essential as well. 
